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INTRODUCTION

F

or a long time, democracy was a non-issue in international law. In
1986, the International Court of Justice declared:

However the regime in Nicaragua be defined, adherence by a State to
any particular doctrine does not constitute a violation of customary
international law; to hold otherwise would make nonsense of the fundamental principle of State sovereignty, on which the whole of international law rests, and the freedom of choice of the political, social,
economic and cultural system of a State.1

This perspective changed dramatically in the 1990s following the end of
the ideological dichotomy of the Cold War. A new interventionist U.N.
Security Council and a large number of newly emerging democracies in
Latin America, Africa, and Asia led to a widespread euphoria about democracy. In response, Francis Fukuyama predicted the “end of history,”2
and legal scholars started discussing an emerging right to democratic
governance.3
The first major international document addressing this issue was the
Vienna Declaration of the World Conference on Human Rights (“Vienna
Declaration”), which recognized that “[d]emocracy, development and
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent
and mutually reinforcing.”4 The Vienna Declaration not only promotes
democracy as a form of government, but also emphasizes the beneficial
impact of democracy on development.5 This statement runs against the
traditional assumption of modernization theory6 that the stability of a
democracy depends on a State’s level of socio-economic development.7
It promotes democracy as a universal cure for poverty and assumes that
democracy can be established at almost any stage in the developmental
process and in any society.

1. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 123 (June 27).
2. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN xii (1992).
3. See, e.g., Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in International
Law, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 539 (1992); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46 (1992).
4. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration].
5. Id.
6. For an account of modernization theory, see infra Part I.B.2.
7. Adrian Leftwich, Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World,
14 THIRD WORLD Q. 605, 605 (1993).
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The purpose of this Article is to examine these underlying assumptions
and to reconsider democratic entitlement theory in light of democratization theory in order to redefine the claim to democracy by making a more
modest proposal. Instead of finding evidence supporting the emergence
of an unequivocal right to democratic governance, the practices of regional bodies and treaty obligations suggest the existence of a principle
of democratic teleology, according to which States are obligated to develop towards democracy. Part I of the Article sets forth an analytical
framework that clarifies the definition of democracy and assesses the
principal approaches conceptualizing democratization processes. It will
show that there is much uncertainty within the social sciences on what
constitutes an ideal path to democracy. There is consensus that democracy cannot be introduced overnight, but is, rather, a complex and longterm process. Part II addresses approaches to democratic entitlement and
proposes a more differentiated approach that focuses on the process of
democratization rather than the existence of democratic governance. The
subsequent analysis will show that there is no right to democratic governance in international law. Instead, States have an obligation to develop
towards democracy.
I. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Section A of this portion of the Article establishes a working definition
of democracy. After locating two intertwined aspects to the concept—a
binary classification and a gradation—this section argues that the definition of “democracy” should be grounded in the former and should be
minimalist: democracy can be said to exist when a government has been
chosen through periodic and contested elections. In contrast, the gradual
dimension of the concept takes into account normative components to
democracy. These two dimensions will be the basis for the analysis that
follows on democracy in international law.
Section B further develops the theoretical framework of this Article by
critically evaluating three major theories of democratization: cultural
prerequisites theory, modernization theory, and social homogeneity
theory. We will see that democratization is too multifaceted and complex
to be fully captured in any one theory. As various internal as well as external factors interdependently influence democratization, it is difficult to
predict precisely what facilitates transitions to democracy. Instead, democratization, as demonstrated in this Article, is a complex process,
which can take different forms and shapes.
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A. Definition of Democracy
Democracy is a contested concept. Although it seems to be “nonnegotiable” in the Western Hemisphere,8 there remains little consensus on
what “democracy” actually means.9 Scholars flesh out the term with different content. Some propose “thin” or “minimalist” models of democracy,10 while others advocate “thick” or demanding conceptions.11 The
search for a definition of democracy is complicated by the fact that there
is disagreement on whether democracy is a question of kind or one of
degree.12 The former interpretation is a simple binary one—a political
system is either a democracy or not. The latter, in contrast, is gradual—
democracy is a question of degree. Both conceptions, however, are complementary and not mutually exclusive. Conceiving democracy in a gradual
way presupposes that an anterior classification has been made because it
would deprive the concept of every heuristic value to qualify authoritarian or totalitarian regimes as democratic to a certain degree.13 Once a
binary classification has been made, it may be valuable to distinguish different types of democracy on a gradual scale, as long as democracy is not
solely perceived to be an ideal concept. The notion of democracy, thus,
has two dimensions: a binary classification, which differentiates between
democracies and nondemocracies, and a graduation, which distinguishes
between democracies of different quality.
Regarding the binary approach, there are two ways to address the issue
of defining democracy. On the one hand, one can look at whether relevant sources either explicitly or implicitly provide a definition. On the
other hand, one can establish a proper definition of democracy and analyze whether such a concept exists in international law, notwithstanding
whether it is actually called democracy. Although, at first glance, the first
approach seems to be appealing, its application is deceptive. The term
8. IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 1 (2003).
9. LAURENCE WHITEHEAD, DEMOCRATIZATION: THEORY AND EXPERIENCE 14 (2002).
10. See, e.g., Adam Przeworski, Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense, in
DEMOCRACY’S VALUE 23, 23 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón eds., 1999).
11. See Susan Marks, Human Rights, Democracy and Ideology, in 8 COLLECTED
COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW, BOOK 2: THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN EUROPE 51 (Acad. of Eur. Law ed., 1997).
12. GIOVANNI SARTORI, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED 184 (1987).
13. Id. at 184–85. See also Armin von Bogdandy, Demokratisch, demokratischer, am
demokratischsten? Zur Steigerungsfähigkeit eines Verfassungsprinzips am Beispiel einer
Neugestaltung der Verordnungsgebung [Democratic, More Democratic, the Most Democratic? On the Gradual Character of a Constitutional Principle Based on the Example of
a Reform of Executive Regulations], in VERFASSUNG—PHILOSOPHIE—KIRCHE. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ALEXANDER HOLLERBACH ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 364, 367 (Joachim Bohnert
et al. eds., 2001) (F.R.G.).
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“democracy” is used very rarely in international legal documents—
perhaps precisely because of its vagueness. Where it can be found, its
meaning is unspecified.14 The aforementioned Vienna Declaration15 and
the U.N. Secretary General’s Agenda for Peace, for example,16 only allude to democracy’s positive effects on human rights, development, and
peace. International human rights instruments reference notions of democratic society in savings clauses, yet fail to elucidate the meaning of the
word.17
There is one prominent exception, however. In 2000, the U.N. General
Assembly adopted a resolution entitled “Promoting and Consolidating
Democracy.”18 According to the resolution, democracy consists of a
number of different elements: the promotion of pluralism, the protection
of human rights, a separation of powers, the rule of law, elections, the
development of civil society, good governance, sustainable development,
solidarity, and social cohesion.19 Nonetheless, this appears to be more of
a wish list than an attempt to propose a coherent definition of democracy.
It mingles substantive and procedural issues without saying anything
about their interrelation. In addition, the resolution fails to distinguish
between the institutional framework of government and certain programmatic issues, such as sustainable development or social cohesion.20
Turning to political science literature, several definitions of democracy
can be found. Some are minimalist, focusing primarily on elections,21
while others incorporate additional elements, for example, the rule of

14. But cf. STEVEN WHEATLEY, DEMOCRACY, MINORITIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
128–34 (2005) (noting that democracy is defined by international legal documents as a
political system in which power is based on the will of the people). However, the concept
of the will of the people is as abstract as the concept of democracy, making Wheatley’s
definition just as unspecific.
15. Vienna Declaration, supra note 4.
16. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on an Agenda for Peace,
Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, U.N. Doc. S/24111, A/47/277
(June 17, 1992).
17. See American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa Rica” arts.
15, 16(2), 22(3), 32(2), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 144 [hereinafter American Convention]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 14(1), 21, 22(2), Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 6(1), 8(2), 9(2), 10(2), 11(2), Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 222.
18. G.A. Res. 55/96, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/96 (Dec. 4, 2000).
19. Id.
20. See SARTORI, supra note 12, at 90 (explaining this distinction).
21. Przeworski, supra note 10.
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law,22 the preservation of civil and political rights,23 minority protection,24 or the existence of social rights.25 Defining democracy is such a
difficult task because the debates on what democracy is and what democracy should be are often intermingled.26 As its definition is highly contested and malleable at its borders,27 this analysis will concentrate on the
core of democracy: the legitimation of public power through elections. A
political system may be deemed a democracy when its government is
designated through periodic and contested elections.28 Elections are contested when their outcomes are uncertain ex ante and irreversible ex
post.29
This definition is meant to be purely descriptive, not normative. It does
not ignore that there are good reasons for more demanding concepts of
democracy. However, because the implementation of the rule of law or
the protection of human rights, for example, are separate institutions,
distinguishable from the establishment of democracy, they should be
subject to independent analyses.30 It is possible to imagine an autocratic
regime observing the rule of law or complying with human rights obligations. An autocracy in which the government is appointed through contested elections, however, is a contradictio in adjecto.
As previously mentioned, democracy also has a second, qualitative
dimension. Recently, Susan Marks cautioned against adopting a minimalist concept of democracy in international law.31 If States have
22. See, e.g., Armin von Bogdandy, Globalization and Europe: How to Square Democracy, Globalization, and International Law, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 885, 889–90 (2004).
23. ROBERT ALAN DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 3 (1971) (including freedom of expression, information, and association, as well as an inclusive status
of citizenship in his definition of democracy).
24. Steven Wheatley, Democracy in International Law: A European Perspective, 51
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 225, 247 (2002).
25. See generally DAVID BEETHAM, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1999) (advocating a democracy theory based on social rights).
26. In particular, theorists proposing a “thick” concept of democracy often take an
idealist position, allowing their vision of an ideal political system to influence their definition of democracy.
27. WHITEHEAD, supra note 9, at 15.
28. See ADAM PRZEWORSKI ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS AND WELL-BEING IN THE WORLD, 1950–1990 at 14–18 (2000) (proposing
this definition).
29. Id. at 16.
30. Manfred G. Schmidt, Ist die Demokratie wirklich die beste Staatsverfassung? [Is
Democracy Really the Best Form of Government?], 28 ÖSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT
FÜR POLITIKWISSENSCHAFT 187, 191–92 (1999) (Austria).
31. Susan Marks, The “Emerging Norm”: Conceptualizing “Democratic Governance,”
91 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 372, 373 (1997); Marks, supra note 11, at 78–88.

40

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 34:1

reached a certain minimum threshold, they would become immune from
further critique, which is an undesirable consequence, given the tendency
in international relations to idealize democracy.32 Marks, therefore, proposes
a gradual definition of democracy.33 Nevertheless gradual conceptualizations are not a substitute for classificatory ones. Instead of incorporating
normative concerns into the definition of democracy itself, this Article
addresses this critique by including a gradual dimension in the concept of
democracy, supplementing the proposed binary definition, which centers
upon the role of elections.
B. Theories of Democratization
The transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic system is
not simply a shift in political status, but a social process influenced by
various external factors. When the debate on democratization started in
the late 1950s, it addressed the issue by analyzing the “prerequisites of
democracy.”34 In its strict sense, the term suggests that democracy has
certain requirements, without which democracy is unable to function.
Still today, there are authors who promote such a strict approach and argue
that certain cultural environments are hostile to democracy. The majority
of scholars, however, pursue a more moderate approach. They try to
identify socio-economic factors that may be favorable to the establishment of democracy. The earliest and most influential school is that of
modernization theory, which seeks to establish a correlation between
economic development and democracy. Other scholars inquire into the
relationship between ethnic, social, or religious homogeneity and the
prospects for democracy.
1. Cultural Prerequisites
The theory of cultural prerequisites argues that the establishment of
democracy depends on the cultural environment of a State. Samuel Huntington, the most prominent proponent of this theory, divides the world
into eight major civilizations: Japanese, Latin American, Western, African, Buddhist, Orthodox, Confucian, and Islamic.35 Among these, only
the first three cultures are regarded as favorable for democracy. Confu-

32. Marks, supra note 11, at 81–82.
33. Id. at 87.
34. See Seymour Martin Lipset, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL. SC. REV. 69 (1959) [hereinafter Lipset, Some Social Requisites].
35. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 25–26
(1993).
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cian and Islamic civilizations are seen as hostile to democracy, while the
remaining three are viewed as neutral.36 There is some empirical evidence supporting Huntington’s thesis,37 but his argument is unconvincing.
Experience shows that Confucianism and Islam are not per se inimical to
democracy.38 Although a lack of separation between belief systems and
politics may present an obstacle to the establishment of a democratic society, such fluidity is not particular to Confucianism or Islam, but rather
an expression of socio-economic progression.39 Religious or cultural patterns are subject to change during the course of social development.40 An
example in this respect is the development of Catholic societies. Although
Catholicism was regarded as a major obstacle to democratization a few
decades ago,41 many states with predominantly Catholic populations have
since developed into stable democracies. Therefore, religion or culture is
not an absolute impediment to, but at most a surmountable difficulty in,
the process of democratization.
However, the question of the cultural prerequisites of democracy is not
purely empirical. It also has a normative dimension. If the preconditions
for democratization are established in a certain society, these necessarily
36. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 300 (1991).
37. According to the IMF, Brunei Darussalam, Hong Kong, Kuwait, Qatar, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates are among the thirty most developed States based on
their per capita incomes of more than 20,000 USD. These States, which could be classified under Huntington’s political and cultural taxonomy as Confucian or Islamic, do not
qualify as electoral democracies according to Freedom House’s Annual Global Survey of
Political Rights and Civil Liberties. Compare INT’L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK DATABASE (Apr. 2007), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/01/data/
index.aspx (providing GDP data for 2004), with FREEDOM HOUSE, SELECTED DATA FROM
FREEDOM HOUSE’S ANNUAL GLOBAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
(2007), http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/press_release/fiw07_charts.pdf.
38. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, as well as Indonesia can be considered electoral
democracies. The first three countries are influenced by Confucianism, while Indonesia is
home to the largest Muslim population in the world.
39. Pippa Norris & Ronald Inglehart, Islamic Culture and Democracy: Testing the
“Clash of Civilizations” Thesis, 1 COMP. SOC. 235, 239–41 (2002).
40. WOLFGANG MERKEL & HANS-JÜRGEN PUHLE, VON DER DIKTATUR ZUR DEMOKRATIE: TRANSFORMATIONEN, ERFOLGSBEDINGUNGEN, ENTWICKLUNGSPFADE [FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY: TRANSFORMATIONS, CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS, TRAJECTORIES]
40 (1999) (F.R.G.); Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Prerequisites of Democracy Revisited, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 7 (1994) [hereinafter Lipset, Democracy Revisited].
41. Cf., e.g., Kenneth A. Bollen, Political Democracy and the Timing of Development, 44 AM. SOC’Y REV. 572, 584 (1979) (noting support for the view that “the greater
the extent to which a culture is Protestant-based, the greater the level of political democracy”); Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec, in CANADIAN
DUALISM 241, 245 (Mason Wade & Jean-C. Falardeau eds., 1960).
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lead to cultural changes. From a normative perspective, this raises some
problems. In the 1990s, some Asian governmental leaders, such as Malaysia’s former Prime Minister, Mahathir bin Mohamed, and Singapore’s
former Head of State, Lee Kuan Yew, engaged in a debate on Asian values. They argued that Western democracy should not be imposed on
Asian societies because it conflicts with certain Asian traditions. While
Western democracy is a system of rights, according to these leaders,
Asian societies perceive political communities to be embedded in a system of obligations and emphasize community-oriented values.42
Significant weight, however, should not be afforded to the assertion
that cultural values exempt a State from pursuing democracy. Politicians
may be strategically seeking to preserve the status quo from which they
benefit. Moreover, making appeals to culture-based exceptions assumes
an authority to define a given set of values.43 Furthermore, cultural relativism fails to answer the question of who determines the composition of
the group whose cultural tradition shall be relevant. It is not imperative
to take the collectivity of citizens as the point of reference because a
population can be very heterogeneous.44 If the argument referring to
Asian values is not of a purely strategical nature, its main purpose is to
reinforce collective values.45 As long as we understand democracy as a
procedural framework, though, the concept has sufficient flexibility to
realize a wide range of different value systems. Consequently, cultural
diversity does not per se discredit the universal promotion of democratic
rules.
2. Modernization Theory and its Modifications
Modernization theory attempts to establish a relationship between the
development of a State and its degree of democratization.46 In 1959,
Martin Seymour Lipset made the groundbreaking claim that “the more
well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democra-

42. Diane Mauzy, The Human Rights and “Asian Values” Debate in Southeast Asia:
Trying to Clarify the Key Issues, 10 PAC. REV. 210, 215 (1997).
43. WOLFGANG MERKEL, DEMOKRATIE IN ASIEN. EIN KONTINENT ZWISCHEN DIKTATUR
UND DEMOKRATIE [DEMOCRACY IN ASIA. A CONTINENT BETWEEN DICTATORSHIP AND
DEMOCRACY] 91 (2003) (F.R.G.).
44. Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479, 488–89 (1989).
45. Jürgen Habermas, Remarks on Legitimation Through Human Rights, in THE
POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL ESSAYS, 113, 124–25 (Max Pensky ed. &
trans., Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2001).
46. See Larry Diamond, Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered, in
REEXAMINING DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET 93, 93 (Gary
Marks & Larry Diamond eds., 1992); Lipset, Some Social Requisites, supra note 34.
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cy.”47 Lipset argued that economic development leads to higher levels of
urbanization48 and education,49 and to the establishment of a middle class
with increased socio-economic mobility. This mobility deprives the underclass of its revolutionary potential and thus supports the stability of a
democratic system.50 Political elites are also less likely to be disadvantaged during periods of governmental change because the relative effect
of a policy change is stronger in poorer countries. 51
Since the publication of Lipset’s theory, several empirical studies have
confirmed a correlation between economic development and democratization, showing that higher economic prosperity increases the probability
that a State will have a stable democratic system.52 However, there is no
causal relationship between both factors.53 Economic development is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient precondition for democracy. There
are important examples that disprove a determinist relationship. India,
for example, has been a relatively stable democracy for several decades
notwithstanding its per capita GDP, which has remained below 1000
USD.54 In contrast, several Arab States with higher per capita incomes
have yet to develop democratic structures. Furthermore, data suggests
that economic development is not the principle cause for transitions to
democracy. Economic prosperity merely stabilizes democratic institutions once they have developed.55 Poor democracies also face a high
probability of collapsing; only after reaching a certain stage of development are democracies sufficiently stable to survive economic crises.56
However, economic development is not the only factor that influences
the democratization process. All political systems have informal rules and

47. Lipset, Some Social Requisites, supra note 34, at 75.
48. Id. at 78.
49. Id. at 78–82; Seymour Martin Lipset, et al., A Comparative Analysis of the Social
Requisites of Democracy, 45 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 155, 167 (1993).
50. Lipset, Some Social Requisites, supra note 34, at 83.
51. Id. at 84.
52. PHILIP COULTER, SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (1975); Kenneth A. Bollen & Robert W. Jackman, Economic and Noneconomic Determinants of
Political Democracy in the 1960s, 1 RES. POL. SOC. 27, 42 (1985); Diamond, supra note
46, at 93–96; Lipset, et al., supra note 49.
53. MANFRED G. SCHMIDT, DEMOKRATIETHEORIEN [DEMOCRACY THEORIES] 441
(2000) (F.R.G.); MERKEL & PUHLE, supra note 40, at 33; Bruce J. Bueno de Mesquita &
George W. Downs, Development and Democracy, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 77 (2005) (noting
that China’s tremendous economic growth has not yielded democratic development).
54. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 37.
55. Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, Modernization: Theories and Facts, 49
WORLD POL. 155, 166 (1997).
56. Id. at 169–70.
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arrangements that support political processes.57 While such mechanisms
may ideally complement formal constitutional institutions and increase
their flexibility, informal networks can be used to pervert democratic
rules if the democratic system is unstable or defective.58 This involves
political actors strengthening their power by relying on exclusive networks outside of constitutional institutions. Such defective democracies
are thus likely to breakdown in social or economic crises or to transform
into open autocracies.
How do defective democracies differ from functional ones? Tatu Vanhanen suggests a rational approach, positing a relationship between the
degree of democratization and the degree to which social power resources are distributed.59 If power resources are widely dispersed, it is
difficult for a specific group within a society to oppress other social
groups by establishing and maintaining hegemonic structures.60 The degree of distribution is related to other socio-economic factors, including
economic development and level of education.61 Vanhanen’s approach
thus supplements rather than modifies modernization theory.
Charles Tilly offers another decisive factor, state institutional capacity.62 According to Tilly, strong civil and political institutions increase the
prospects for a successful democratization process, as these institutions
can offset one of the most significant obstacles to this process, “autonomous power centers.”63 Of course, there are limits: if a State is too
strong, political actors have incentives to claim exclusive power and undermine democratization. Thus, informal “trust networks” have to be
integrated into the public political space.64 While power dispersion continues to serve an important function, it must take place within state institutions, rather than in opposition to them.

57. CHARLES TILLY, DEMOCRACY 88 (2007) (analysing how the establishment of trust
networks facilitates democratic development); Wolfgang Merkel & Aurel Croissant,
Formale und informale Institutionen in defekten Demokratien [Formal and Informal
Institutions in Defective Democracies], 41 POLITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT 3, 16
(2000) (F.R.G.).
58. WOLFGANG MERKEL ET AL., DEFEKTE DEMOKRATIE [DEFECTIVE DEMOCRACY] 28
(2003) (F.R.G.).
59. TATU VANHANEN, PROSPECTS OF DEMOCRACY 5 (1997); Tatu Vanhanen, Social Constraints of Democratization, in STRATEGIES OF DEMOCRATIZATION 19, 21 (Tatu Vanhanen
ed., 1992).
60. VANHANEN, supra note 59, at 5.
61. Vanhanen, supra note 59, at 21.
62. TILLY, supra note 57, at 161–85.
63. Id. at 164.
64. Id. at 80–105.
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Turning to cultural scholarship, commentators have argued that democratization depends on citizens and political elites internalizing similar
understandings of democratic values.65 Certainly, democratic values are
not embraced over night. These values must be learned, accumulated,
and assimilated as social capital.66 Forming them requires education and
experience with democratic institutions.67 Furthermore, socio-economic
change may lead to a transformation of political values.68
In summary, the following conclusions can be drawn. First, the functioning and stability of democracy depend on several interdependent factors:
socio-economic development, the diffusion of power resources, stable
civil and political institutions, and a democratic culture. Accordingly,
democratization rarely takes place abruptly: it is usually a gradual
process.69
3. Cultural and Ethnic Homogeneity
The debate on cultural, religious, and ethnic homogeneity as a precondition for a stable democracy dates back to John Stuart Mill, according to
whom:
Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if
they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary to the working of representative government cannot exist.70

As belonging to a particular cultural, religious, or ethnic group heavily
influences identity, in many pluralistic societies, voting often follows

65. GABRIEL ABRAHAM ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE: POLITICAL
ATTITUDES AND DEMOCRACY IN FIVE NATIONS 498 (1963); Larry Diamond & Juan José
Linz, Introduction: Politics, Society, and Democracy in Latin America, in 4 DEMOCRACY
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LATIN AMERICA 1, 10 (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 1989).
66. ROBERT D. PUTNAM ET AL., MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN
MODERN ITALY 99–116 (1993) (tracing the history of civil communities in Italy).
67. ALMOND & VERBA, supra note 65, at 501. In this context, it is interesting to note
that former British colonies had far more success with the installation of democracy than
the former colonies of other European nations. See also Lipset, Democracy Revisited,
supra note 40, at 5 (comparing the practice of the British with that of other colonial powers in introducing certain democratic institutions in their colonies). See Bollen & Jackman,
supra note 52; Myron Weiner, Empirical Democratic Theory, in COMPETITIVE ELECTIONS
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3, 19 (Myron Weiner & Ergun Özbudun eds., 1987).
68. Diamond & Linz, supra note 65, at 12.
69. Lipset, Democracy Revisited, supra note 40, at 4.
70. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 310
(photo. reprint 1991) (1861).
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social affiliations.71 It is thus barely surprising that empirical studies suggest that the probability of establishing democracy in homogeneous societies is twice as high as in segmented societies.72
Scholars have proposed various remedies to overcome problems associated with diverse societies. The most widely recognized proposal is
Arend Lijphart’s model of consociational democracy.73 Lijphart seeks to
describe a system in which every major social group is represented, identifying four fundamental characteristics: government created by “grand
coalition”; mutual veto rights to protect minority interests; proportional
representation in politics and civil service, as well as proportional distribution of public funds; and a federal structure that gives each social
group significant autonomy.74
However, consociationalism implicitly assumes that human identity is
unalterable. Identity is not an inherent characteristic of human beings,
but a social construct.75 Although identity is not infinitely alterable, it can
change with time and circumstance.76 Research in social psychology also
shows that the interaction among different social groups can enhance the
possibility of forming a common superordinate identity.77 Consociationalist models thus run the risk of deepening rather than overcoming divisions
in society. This does not mean, though, that democracy is impossible in
pluralistic societies. One solution is to put in place voting procedures that
discourage incentives to vote according to cultural, religious, or ethnic
cleavages.78

71. Dirk Berg-Schlosser, Empirische Voraussetzungen und allgemeine Konstituierungsbedingungen von Demokratie [Empirical Premises and Necessary Conditions of
Democracy], in PERSPEKTIVEN DER DEMOKRATIE: PROBLEME UND CHANCEN IM ZEITALTER
DER GLOBALISIERUNG 57, 57 (Dirk Berg-Schlosser & Hans-Joachim Giegel eds., 1999)
(F.R.G.).
72. Adrian Karatnycki, The Decline of Illiberal Democracy, 10 J. DEM. 112, 117
(1999).
73. AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACIES: PATTERNS OF MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS
GOVERNMENT IN TWENTY-ONE COUNTRIES 21–36 (1984); AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY
IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter
LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES].
74. LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES, supra note 73, at 25.
75. DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 684 (1985).
76. SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 95.
77. Samuel L. Gaertner et al., The Common Ingroup Identity Model: Recategorization
and the Reduction of Intergroup Bias, 4 EUR. REV. SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 1, 2–3 (1993).
78. See HOROWITZ, supra note 75, at 628–52 (offering proposals for overcoming
political divides along ethnic lines, including mechanisms whereby parties must obtain a
certain minimum number of votes from more than one social group in order to be
elected).
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Nevertheless, attempts to unify through incentive-based voting mechanisms carry certain risks. Without a consensus on the fundamental
rules of the political game, they cannot surmount social divisions.79 The
remedy in these circumstances is to promote socio-economic development. States with highly segmented societies often have weak institutional structures.80 Thus, formal institutions have to be strengthened, and
trust in these institutions must be developed, while a common identity is
concurrently established. Consequently, in the ideal case, nation- and
capacity-building precede the transition to democracy.81
4. Conclusions
The different theories explaining democratization present a complex
picture. The approaches are not mutually exclusive, but rather highlight
different aspects of the process of democratization. Transition to and
consolidation of democracy are dependent on a variety of factors, defying monocausal explanations.82 Therefore, democracy has no necessary
or sufficient prerequisites, meaning that neither low levels of economic
development nor significant cultural, religious, or ethnic heterogeneity
preclude the establishment of a relatively stable democracy.83 Conversely, significant economic prosperity or social homogeneity do not lead to
an automatic transition to democracy.
Despite the lack of causal explanations, there still remain significant
correlations between economic development and social cohesion, and
democratization. Low economic development or weak social homogeneity
can endanger the consolidation of democracy. These obstacles are malleable,84 but they are subject to long-term processes that are not necessarily
steady.85 As a result, sometimes it may be more effective to compromise
short-term successes in order to pursue long-term goals.86 Furthermore,
in certain circumstances, it may be advisable to engage in nation- and
79. Andrew Reynolds, Constitutional Medicine, 16 J. DEM. 54, 57 (2005).
80. TILLY, supra note 57, at 176–77.
81. Philippe C. Schmitter & Javier Santiso, Three Temporal Dimensions to the Consolidation of Democracy, 19 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 69, 81 (1998).
82. MERKEL & PUHLE, supra note 40, 62; SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 80.
83. MAMOUDOU GAZIBO, LES PARADOXES DE LA DÉMOCRATISATION EN AFRIQUE [THE
PARADOXES OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA] 228 (2005) (Fr.).
84. Juan José Linz & Alfred Stephan, Toward Consolidated Democracies, 7.2 J. DEM.
14, 23 (1996).
85. RALF DAHRENDORF, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN EUROPE 99–100 (2005);
Schmitter & Santiso, supra note 81, at 82–84.
86. Javier Santiso, A la recherche des temporalités de la democratization [In Search
of the Temporalities of Democratization] 44 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE
1079, 1082 (1994) (Fr.).
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identity-building before fostering the establishment of institutions. Because there is no universally valid formula for success, many political
scientists stress the unpredictable character of democratization, describing it as a “complex, long-term, dynamic and open-ended process.”87
Although elections are typically a step in the overall process, they are
not necessarily the first step.88 Democratization is thus a teleological
process,89 and its final objective is the establishment of a legitimate form
of government. This process, though, does not necessarily have to be
democratic itself.90
II. DEMOCRATIC TELEOLOGY IN POSITIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW
Given the process-like character of democratization, Part II of this
Article examines how this understanding of democracy is reflected in
positive international law, while paying particular attention to how our
working definition of democracy, which centers upon the role of elections, is represented in institutional and regional practice. Towards this
end, this section critically reviews two approaches to identifying customary norms: deductive and inductive. The first relies on an interpretative
methodology in identifying customary norms.91 According to this approach, some scholars try to deduce customary norms from more abstract
principles. Based on the assumption that the legal system is holistic and
without internal contradictions, a rule must be considered customary law
if it follows necessarily from a more general principle that has already
been accepted.92 Section A considers the attempts of some scholars to
employ this interpretative approach in order to deduce a right to democratic governance from the principle of self-determination.
87. WHITEHEAD, supra note 9, at 27.
88. Marks, supra note 11, at 87.
89. Andreas Schedler, What is Democratic Consolidation?, 9 J. DEM. 91, 95 (1998).
When Whitehead emphasizes the open-endedness of the process, he does not want to
contest the teleological character of democratization. See WHITEHEAD, supra note 9, at 28
(observing that democracy is a concept that is, to a certain extent, indeterminate and can
be implemented in a variety of different ways).
90. See Schmitter & Santiso, supra note 81, at 79 (discussing the undemocratic nature
of many democratization processes).
91. See Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom,
Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUST. Y.B. INT’L L. 82 (1992) (showcasing the
development towards more interpretative methods in identifying customary international
law).
92. Albert Bleckmann, Völkergewohnheitsrecht trotz widersprüchlicher Praxis?
[Customary International Law Despite Contrary Practice?] 36 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L.
374, 390 (1976) (F.R.G.); Christian Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without or
Against Their Will, 241 RECUEIL DES COURS 195, 293–300 (1993).
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According to the inductive approach, customary norms are identified
by inducing them from state practice and opinio juris.93 In Section B, we
will thus analyze the relevant international practice on democracy, such
as different U.N. resolutions, regional mechanisms designed to preserve
democracy, and the reactions of the international community to coups
against elected regimes. This analysis will show that international law
does not contain a right to democratic governance. Instead, it will identify a principle of democratic teleology, that is, States are legally obliged
to develop towards democracy.
A. Self-Determination
Scholars have used the deductive approach in an attempt to derive a right
to democratic governance from the principle of self-determination.94 There
are two strands to this argument, one contextual and the other logical.
This Section argues that both fall short. Although there is a textual relationship between democracy and self-determination within the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR” or “Covenant”),
it does not translate into a customary principle of self-determination. The
logical argument fails because it does not take into account the difference
between establishing a political system and the content of the political
system itself. Instead, this Section proposes that self-determination only
requires a government to be representative, not democratic.

93. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933.
94. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL
REAPPRAISAL 311 (1995); Antonio Cassese, The Self-Determination of Peoples, in THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 92, 97
(Louis Henkin ed., 1981); Juan Francisco Escudero Espinosa, Hacia una Intervención
Armada en Favor de la Democracia?: El “Precedente” de Haití [Towards Armed Intervention in Favor of Democracy?: The “Precedent” of Haiti], 12 ANUARIO DE DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL 297, 344–56 (1996); Allan Rosas, Internal Self-Determination, in MODERN
LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 225, 241–46 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993); LinosAlexandre Sicilianos, Les Nations Unies et la démocratisation de l’Etat: Nouvelles tendances, [The United Nations and the Democratization of the State: New Trends], in LA
CONTRIBUTION DES NATIONS UNIES À LA DÉMOCRATISATION DE L’ETAT 13, 24 (Rostane
Mehdi ed., 2002); Patrick Thornberry, The Democratic or Internal Aspect of SelfDetermination with Some Remarks on Federalism, in MODERN LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION,
supra, at 101, 134–37; Daniel Thürer, Self-Determination, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB.
INT’L L. 364, 372 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 2000).
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1. Democracy as Mandatory Consequence of Self-Determination
Originally, self-determination had a primarily external direction, its
strongest impact occurring in the context of decolonization.95 However,
through its incorporation into Common Article 1 of the ICCPR and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,96 it also
gained an internal dimension.97 According to this provision, the principle
of self-determination grants every people, inter alia, the right to determine
their political status freely. The U.N. General Assembly soon after affirmed this interpretation in its Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations (“Friendly Relations Declaration”).98
Two main arguments attempt to deduce a democratic principle from
the right to self-determination. The first argument is contextual and interprets Article 1 of the ICCPR99 in the context of the Covenant’s other
provisions, in particular in conjunction with the right to democratic elections, as prescribed in Article 25.100 According to this argument, the right
to participate in elections informs how the right to determine political
status is exercised.101 However, it seems more convincing to interpret
Articles 1 and 25 in a way that affords them independent normative

95. James Crawford, The Rights of Peoples: “Peoples” or “Governments”?, in THE
RIGHT OF PEOPLES 55, 58 (James, Crawford ed., 1988).
96. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
97. Cassese, supra note, at 94; Christoph Gusy, Selbstbestimmung im Wandel. Von der
Selbstbestimmung durch den Staat zur Selbstbestimmung im Staat [Self-Determination in
Flux. From Self-Determination Through the State to Self-Determination in the State], 30
ARCHIV DES VÖLKERRECHTS 385, 405 (1992) (F.R.G.).
98. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A.
Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations
Declaration].
99. See ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 25.
100. Id.
101. Cassese, supra note at 94; Christian Hillgruber & Bernhard Kempen, Das
Selbstbestimmungsrecht des deutschen Volkes und der Teso-Beschluß des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [The German People’s Right to Self-Determination and Teso-Decision of
the Federal Constitutional Court], 33 RECHT IN OST UND WEST 323, 325–26 (1989)
(F.R.G.); Alexandre-Charles Kiss, The Peoples’ Right to Self-Determination, 7 HUM.
RTS. L.J. 165, 171 (1986); Rosas, supra note 94, at 244; Hans A. Stöcker, Europäische
Menschenrechtskonvention, Ordre-Public-Vorbehalt und nationales Selbstbestimmungsrecht
[The European Convention on Human Rights, the Public Order Exception and the National Right to Self-Determination], 14 EUROPÄISCHE GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFT 473,
477 (1987) (F.R.G.); Thornberry, supra note 94, at 134–37; Thürer, supra note 94, at
372.
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scope.102 If the guarantees of self-determination, as shaped by Article 25
of the ICCPR, do not exceed the right to democratic elections, then the
linkage is unnecessary. In order to ensure elections, Article 25 offers a
sufficient normative basis. If one wants to draw further conclusions, a
mere connection between and abstraction from essentially independent
principles is not enough. If we interpret, for instance, the customary principle of self-determination outside the ICCPR’s framework and in light
of Article 25, then the scope of the electoral guarantee would extend impermissibly beyond the limits of the Covenant.
The second argument is more fundamental. Instead of focusing on the
normative context, it seeks to establish a logical relationship between
self-determination and democracy. The right to choose a political system
belongs to the people, not their government. It has been argued that this
decision must be effectuated through democratic mechanisms, as nondemocratic means are not attributable to a people.103 However, this “logical”
relationship is based on a problematic premise.104 It fails to distinguish
between the act of creating a political system, and the actual content and
structure of government, namely, the pouvoir constituant and the pouvoir
constitué.105 The right to self-determination involves the former, but not
necessarily the latter. History provides several examples where citizens
opted through electoral means to delegate power to political elites who
then established authoritarian rule.106
One solution to this dilemma is to distinguish formally between the act
of establishing a political system and the political system itself. The participation of citizens is limited to the former. If they choose a system
other than democracy, they have, by this act, exhausted their right to selfdetermination.107 However, this view cannot explain why the act of self102. Christian Tomuschat, Democratic Pluralism: The Right to Political Opposition,
in HUMAN RIGHTS AND PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 27, 40 (Allan Rosas et al. eds., 1992).
103. Rosas, supra note 94, at 229; Sicilianos, supra note 94, at 24.
104. Cf. Russel A. Miller, Self-Determination in International Law and the Demise of
Democracy?, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 601 (2003) (presenting a historical argument
to challenge the assumed correlation between democracy and self-determination).
105. On this distinction, see Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Die verfassunggebende
Gewalt des Volkes—Ein Grenzbegriff des Verfassungsrechts [The Constituent Power of
the People—A Limit-Concept of Constitutional Law], in STAAT, VERFASSUNG, DEMOKRATIE
90, 98–107 (1991) (F.R.G.).
106. Jürgen Gebhardt, Das demokratische Prinzip und die moderne politische Ordnung [The Democratic Principle and the Modern Political Order], in DEMOKRATIE—
CHANCEN UND HERAUSFORDERUNGEN IM 21. JAHRHUNDERT 19, 28 (André Kaiser &
Wolfgang Leidhold eds., 2005) (F.R.G.).
107. Karl Doehring, Demokratie und Völkerrecht [Democracy and International Law],
in TRADITION UND WELTOFFENHEIT DES RECHTS. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HELMUT STEINBERGER
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determination should be irreversible. Electoral outcomes depend on specific historical circumstances, and these circumstances may change over
time, just as citizens’ preferences or the very composition of a population
itself. Therefore, it is difficult to justify why the citizenry of one historical moment should have the power to bind future generations.
Gregory Fox and Georg Nolte set forth another solution in their contribution on “intolerant democracies.”108 Addressing whether democracies
should be allowed to fight political tendencies directed against the system itself, they propose a substantive concept of democracy. According
to their concept, electoral results may be disregarded in order to prevent
an undemocratic opposition from coming to power, thereby protecting
democracy as such. This argument, though, exhibits a predisposition towards democracy.109 Democracy, or even a specific type of substantive
democracy, is considered to be an absolute value a priori. It has been
shown, however, that the value of democracy always depends on socioeconomic circumstances.110 Thus, Alberto Asor Rosa’s statement is quite
astute:
[D]emocracy, precisely because it is a system of mediocrity that cannot
make itself out to be an absolute or an end in itself . . . is a game whose
defining feature is that it allows its own rules to be called into question.
If it does not, it is already something else.111

2. Representation and Self-Determination
Nevertheless, this observation does not lead to the conclusion that the
right to self-determination does not impose any restrictions on the power
of political elites to choose a form of government. With regard to the
principle of self-determination, the United Nations stated in its Friendly
Relations Declaration:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing
or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or
127, 129 (Hans-Joachim Cremer, Thomas Giegerich & Dagmar Richter eds., 2002)
(F.R.G.).
108. Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1
(1995).
109. Martti Koskenniemi, “Intolerant Democracies”: A Reaction, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J.
231, 232–33 (1996).
110. See supra Part I.B.
111. Alberto Asor Rosa, La felicità e la politica [Happiness and Politics], LABORATORIO POLITICO Mar./Apr. 1981, at 10, 30–31 (Italy) (“[L]a democrazia, proprio in
quanto sistema delle mediocrità, che non si assolutizza e non si erige esso stesso a fine . .
. è quel tale gioco che accetta di rimettere in discussione le proprie regole. Se non lo fa, è
già un’altra cosa.”) (author’s translation).
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in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above
and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.112

Consequently, not every form of government is compatible with selfdetermination. To conform, a government must be representative. A further argument supports this observation. If a government could exclusively
determine the content of self-determination, then the principle of selfdetermination would not differ from the principle of state sovereignty
and thus lose any independent value.113
However, representation does not necessarily have to be realized
through elections. It may be realized by a government acting in the public
interest, functioning as a government for the people. In this circumstance, the problem is determining what form of government should be
recognized as representative. Unlike democracy, representativeness cannot be determined by the sole existence of certain institutions. Offering
a helpful, substantive proposal, Georg Sørensen distinguishes among
development-oriented regimes, growth-oriented regimes, and self-enriching
regimes.114 While development-oriented regimes strive to promote economic development as well as individual well-being, growth-oriented
regimes focus on fostering economic growth without taking into account
its effects on society.115 Of the three, self-enriching regimes are incompatible with the right to self-determination. A second indicator of a
representative government is its human rights record. Not every human
rights violation renders a government illegitimate, as such violations occur
even in the most advanced political systems.116 However, where systematic violations of core human rights take place within its borders, a
State is not representative of its citizens. It is illegitimate and, as a result,
infringes upon the right of its population to self-determination.

112. Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 98, pmbl. (emphasis added).
113. Crawford, supra note 95, at 56.
114. GEORG SØRENSEN, DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION. PROCESS AND PROSPECTS
IN A CHANGING WORLD 76–81 (1998).
115. Id.
116. Certainly, a State remains responsible for its human rights violations even if the
violations do not directly undermine the legitimacy of the State.
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B. International Practice: Establishing Democratic Teleology
The inductive approach relies on the practice of international institutions.117 This Section examines the approach to democracy in international law through the lens of democratization theory. It argues that international law does not contain a strict right to democratic governance, but
rather a principle of democratic teleology. This principle has two dimensions.118 States are not required to transition to democracy right away,
but rather, must to develop towards democracy. Similarly, they are also
obligated to prevent regressions in the process of democratization.119
Evidence supporting these two dimensions can be found in various
fields of international law. The following analysis concentrates on three
areas of especial importance. First it focuses on universal human rights
instruments and the practice of international institutions, including the
U.N. General Assembly. This appraisal reveals that the relevant documents predominantly employ process-oriented language that focuses on
democratization instead of democracy. Moreover, the practices of regional
bodies in the Americas, Europe, and Africa will be considered.120 Instead
117. See JUDE I. IBEGBU, RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 141–205
(2003); WHEATLEY, supra note 14, at 135–36; Tom J. Farer, The Promotion of Democracy: International Law and Norms, in THE UN ROLE IN PROMOTING DEMOCRACY:
BETWEEN IDEALS AND REALITY 32, 32 (Edward Newman & Roland Rich eds., 2004);
Fox, supra note 3; Franck, supra note 3; Christian Fulda, Demokratie und pacta sunt
servanda [Democracy and Pacta Sunt Servanda] (May 8, 2002) (unpublished Dr. iur.
dissertation, Humboldt University, Berlin) (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) (F.R.G.); Dodzi Kokoroko, Souveraineté étatique et principe de légitimité
démocratique [State Sovereignty and the Principle of Democratic Legitimacy], 16 REVUE
QUÉBÉCOISE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 37, 40 (2003) (Can.); Juliane Kokott, Souveräne
Gleichheit und Demokratie im Völkerrecht [Sovereign Equality, and Democracy in International Law], 64 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 517, 526–27 (2004) (F.R.G.); Christian Pippan,
Gibt es ein Recht auf Demokratie im Völkerrecht? [Is There a Right to Democracy in
International Law?], in POPPER UND DIE MENSCHENRECHTE 119, 137–60 (Erwin Riefler
ed., 2007) (F.R.G.); Roland Rich, Bringing Democracy into International Law, 12.3 J.
DEM. 20, 21 (2001); Sicilianos, supra note 94; Attila Tanzi, Remarks on Democracy in
Contemporary International Law, 61 LA COMUNITÀ INTERNAZIONALE 289 (2006); Christian Tomuschat, L’intervention structurelle des Nations Unies [The Structural Intervention of the United Nations], in LA CONTRIBUTION DES NATIONS UNIES À LA
DÉMOCRATISATION DE L’ETAT, supra note 94, at 101; David Wippman, Defending Democracy Through Foreign Intervention, 19 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 659, 665–68 (1997); Jan
Wouters et al., Democracy and International Law, 34 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 137 (2003).
118. See Schedler, supra note 89, at 98.
119. Id.
120. The following analysis omits a detailed account on Asia. This is due to the fact
that commitments to democracy are at best embryonic. Nevertheless, some positive
trends can be observed in the framework of the Association of South East Asian Nations
(“ASEAN”). Democracy is first mentioned in the ASEAN’s Vientiane Action Program
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of dealing with positive progress, these bodies focus on enforcement mechanisms meant to prevent setbacks once democracy has been introduced. The Section concludes by looking at military interventions in the
name of democracy. Implicitly condemning the ousting of elected heads
of state, these interventions also emphasize the need to prevent setbacks
in the process of democratization.
1. International Institutions
(a) Right to Democratic Elections Under the ICCPR
Universal treaties are a well-recognized indicator for the existence of
customary norms. When States enter into treaty obligations, they express
their intent to be bound by its norms and thus manifest a corresponding
opinio juris.121 The most important treaty norm in this context is Article
25 of the ICCPR. It ensures the right to genuine, periodic elections,
which thereby guarantees the free expression of the electorate’s will.122
Although socialist States originally argued—based on the travaux préparatoire—that one-party systems could conform to Article 25, there is
now consensus among international legal scholars that voters must have
a more “meaningful choice” in order for a State to meet the Covenant’s
requirements.123 A “free expression of the will of the electors”124 and
(“VAP”). Under Title II of the VAP, the enhancement of democracy is listed as one of
the goals of ASEAN. The declaration employs process-oriented language, stating that
democracy should be enhanced and presenting democracy as a goal, not a strict obligation. Vientiane Action Program Title II (1), Nov. 29, 2004, available at http://www.
aseansec.org/VAP-10th%20ASEAN%20Summit.pdf. For more detailed accounts of democracy in the context of ASEAN, see Amitav Acharya, Democratization and the Prospects for Participatory Regionalism in Southeast Asia, 24 THIRD WORLD Q. 375, 378
(2003); Richard Burchill, Regional Integration and the Promotion and Protection of Democracy and Human Rights in Asia: Lessons from ASEAN (Working, Paper), http://law.
nus.edu.sg/aslasi/workingpapers/2007/doc/Mr%ØRichard%20Burchill.pdf (last visited Oct.
20, 2008).
121. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42 (Feb. 20). For
additional commentary on the issue of treaties as indicators of customary law, see generally Richard R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES COURS 25 (1970).
122. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 25.
123. SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY ¶ 22.31 (2d ed. 2004); Gregory H. Fox,
The Right to Political Participation in International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 48, 57–59 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000); Karl
Josef Partsch, Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms, in THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, supra
note 94, at 209, 240; Niels Petersen, Elections, Right to Participate in, International Protection, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L. ¶ 3, available at http://www.mpepil.

56

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 34:1

“[participation] in the conduct of public affairs”125 are only possible
when voters have a choice between not only different persons, but also
different political agendas.126
Thus far, 160 States have ratified the ICCPR.127 More than eighty percent of the international community has agreed to select their governments
through free and fair elections. However, there are notable exceptions.
China and Pakistan, two of the ten most populous States in the world,
have failed to ratify the ICCPR.128 Furthermore, the list of abstaining
countries shows patterns of regional concentration. Especially in East and
Southeast Asia,129 a considerable number of States have not committed
themselves to holding periodic elections. Moreover, the number of States
parties becomes less impressive when actual state practice is considered.
Many of the States that have ratified the ICCPR do not actually practice
electoral democracy. According to a 2007 survey of Freedom House,
only two-thirds of the signatory States qualify as electoral democracies.130
Mere commitment to Article 25 without accompanying state practice is
insufficient to establish a customary principle of democracy.131
com/subscriber_article?script=yes&id=/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-e785&recno=1&s
earchType=Advanced&author=petersen (last visited Oct. 27, 2008).
124. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 25(b).
125. Id. art. 25(a).
126. U.N. Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee Under
Article 5, Paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights—Forty-Eighth Session—Concerning Communication No. 314/199
(Bwalya v. Zambia), ¶ 6.6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/314/1988 (Mar. 30, 1988).
127. As of October 17, 2008, the following States have yet to ratify the Covenant:
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bhutan, Brunei, China, Comoros, Cuba, Fiji, GuineaBissau, Kiribati, Laos, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Moldova, Myanmar,
Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, São Tomé
and Príncipe, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, United Arab
Emirates, and Vanuatu. See Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Status of Ratifications, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, http://www2.
ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/4.htm [hereinafter ICCPR Ratifications] (last visited
Nov. 13, 2008).
128. Id. (both Pakistan and China are signatories to the Convention).
129. Bhutan, Brunei, China, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Singapore have
yet to ratify the Covenant. Id.
130. Arch Puddington, Freedom in the World 2007: Freedom Stagnation Amid Pushback Against Democracy, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=130&year
=2007 (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
131. VALENTINA GRADO, GUERRE CIVILI E TERZI STATI [CIVIL WAR AND THIRD
STATES] 260 (1998) (Italy); BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 417 (1999); Dietrich Schindler, Völkerrecht und Demokratie [International Law and Democracy], in LIBER AMICORUM PROFESSOR SEIDL–HOHENVELDERN—IN
HONOUR OF HIS 80TH BIRTHDAY 611, 622 (Gerhard Hafner et al. eds., 1998) (Neth.); Ste-

2008]

THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRATIC TELEOLOGY

57

(b) Declarations of the U.N. General Assembly
The U.N. General Assembly has put forth a more modest approach.
Since 1988, it has been issuing resolutions in a series entitled “Enhancing
the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections.”132
The first resolution does not contain an explicit affirmation of a right to
democratic elections. Instead, in the resolution, the General Assembly
2. [s]tresses its conviction that periodic and genuine elections are a necessary and indispensable element of sustained efforts to protect the
rights and interests of the governed and that, as a matter of practical
experience, the right of everyone to take part in the government of his
or her country is a crucial factor in the effective enjoyment by all of a
wide range of other human rights and fundamental freedoms, including
political, economic, social, and cultural rights;
3. [d]eclares that determining the will of the people requires an electoral process which accommodates distinct alternatives, and this process
should provide an equal opportunity for all citizens to become candidates and put forward their political views, individually and in cooperation with others.133

fan Talmon, Who is a Legitimate Government in Exile? Towards Normative Criteria for
Governmental Legitimacy in International Law, in THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN BROWNLIE 499, 534 (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon
eds., 1999); Same Varayudej, A Right to Democracy in International Law: Its Implications for Asia, 12 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 8, 17 (2006); Wheatley, supra note 24,
at 233; Mirko Zambelli, La démocratie: principe universel et fondamental de l’ordre
juridique international? [Democracy: Universal and Fundamental Principle of the International Legal Order?], 10 AKTUELLE JURISTISCHE PRAXIS 667, 673 (2001) (Fr.). For
opposing evaluations, see Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 123, at 25, 27;
Fulda, supra note 117, at 86; Nigel D. White, The United Nations and Democracy Assistance: Developing Practice Within a Constitutional Framework, in DEMOCRACY
ASSISTANCE: INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION FOR DEMOCRATIZATION 67, 72 (Peter Burnell ed., 2000).
132. G.A. Res. 62/150, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/150 (Dec. 18, 2007); G.A. Res. 60/162,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/162 (Dec. 16, 2005); G.A. Res. 58/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/180
(Dec. 22, 2003); G.A. Res. 56/159, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/159 (Dec. 19, 2001); G.A. Res.
54/173, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/173 (Dec. 17, 1999); G.A. Res. 52/129, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/52/129 (Dec. 12, 1997); G.A. Res. 50/185, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/185 (Dec. 22,
1995); G.A. Res. 49/190, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/190 (Dec. 23, 1994); G.A. Res. 48/131,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/131 (Dec. 20, 1993); G.A. Res. 47/138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/138
(Dec. 18, 1992); G.A. Res. 46/137, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/137 (Dec. 17, 1991); G.A. Res.
45/150, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/150 (Dec. 18, 1990); G.A. Res. 44/146, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/146 (Dec. 15, 1989); G.A. Res. 43/157, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/157 (Dec. 8,
1988).
133. G.A. Res. 43/157, supra note 132, ¶¶ 1–2 (emphasis added).
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Instead of imposing a strict obligation, the resolution stresses the importance of elections. Paragraph 2 emphasizes that elections are a necessary
precondition for output legitimacy, while also invoking an empirical justification.134 In contrast, Paragraph 3 is of a normative nature, referring to
the “will of the people” and highlighting the necessity of implementing
their will through an electoral process.135
This resolution was slightly amended in following years. The successive versions contain reservations underlining the autonomy of States to
develop their own political systems. Adopted in 1991, Resolution
46/137, for example,
[r]ecogniz[es] that there is no single political system or electoral method
that is equally suited to all nations and their people and that the efforts
of the international community to enhance the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections should not call into question
each State’s sovereign right, in accordance with the will of its people,
freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural
systems, whether or not they conform to the preferences of other
States.136

Furthermore, in the operative part, this Resolution
[u]nderscores the duty of each Member State, in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to respect the decisions
taken by other States, in accordance with the will of their people, in
freely choosing and developing their electoral institutions.137

Concurrently, in 1989 the General Assembly adopted a counterresolution series, “Respect for the Principles of National Sovereignty and
Non-interference in the Internal Affairs of States in their Electoral
Processes,”138 which stresses the right of peoples to determine their polit134. Id.
135. Id.
136. G.A. Res. 46/137, supra note 132, ¶ 5 (emphasis added). The two resolutions
passed in 1989 and 1990 include this paragraph in the operative part instead of the
preamble. G.A. Res. 45/150, supra note 132; G.A. Res. 44/146, supra note 132.
137. Id. (emphasis added).
138. G.A. Res. 54/168, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/168 (Dec. 17, 1999); U.N. Doc.
A/RES/52/119 (Dec. 12, 1997); G.A. Res. 50/172, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/172 (Dec. 22,
1995); G.A. Res. 49/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/180 (Dec. 23, 1994); G.A. Res. 48/124,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/124 (Dec. 20, 1993); G.A. Res. 47/130, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/130
(Dec. 18, 1992); G.A. Res. 46/130, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/130 (Dec. 17, 1991); G.A. Res.
45/151, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/151 (Dec. 18, 1990); G.A. Res. 44/147, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/147 (Dec. 15, 1989). From 2001, the resolutions were adopted with a revised
text that stresses the relationship between a people’s right to determine their political
system and the development of electoral institutions. See G.A. Res. 60/164, U.N. Doc.
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ical, economic, and social systems. In this Resolution, the General Assembly
1. [r]eiterates that, by virtue of the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,
all peoples have the right, freely and without external interference, to
determine their political status and to pursue their economic, social and
cultural development, and that every State has the duty to respect that
right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter;
2. Affirms that it is the concern solely of peoples to determine methods
and to establish institutions regarding the electoral process, as well as
to determine the ways for its implementation according to their constitution and national legislation;
[. . .]
4. Urges all States to respect the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States and the sovereign right of peoples to determine
their political, economic and social system.139

At first glance, the two strands in these series appear to contradict each
other.140 While one praises the advantages of an electoral system of government, the other emphasizes the importance of national autonomy as
well as a people’s authority to choose a proper political, economic, and
social system without external interference. However, any seeming contradiction is not as great as some scholars maintain. Even if a people
have the right to determine their political system, the choice is not unlimited. As discussed in the previous section, a legitimate government
must be representative.141 Paragraph 5 of Resolution 46/137 expresses
this point by emphasizing that the choice has to be made “in accordance
with the will of the people.”142 Considering the difficulties of consolidat-

A/RES/60/164 (Dec. 16, 2005); G.A. Res. 58/189, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/189 (Dec. 22,
2003); G.A. Res. 56/154, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/154 (Dec. 19, 2001).
139. G.A. Res. 44/147, supra note 138 (emphasis added).
140. Rafâa Ben Achour, Égalité souveraine des états, droit des peuples à disposer
d’eux-mêmes et liberté de choix du système politique, économique, culturel et social [The
Sovereign Equality of States, the Peoples’ Right to Self-determination, and the Freedom
of Choice of the Political, Economic, Cultural, and Social System], in FEDERICO MAYOR
AMICORUM LIBER: SOLIDARITÉ, ÉGALITÉ, LIBERTÉ 785, 793 (Karel Vasak et al. eds.,
1995) (Belg.); Slim Laghmani, Vers une légitimité démocratique? [Towards a Democratic Legitimacy?], in LES NOUVEAUX ASPECTS DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 249, 269 (Rafâa
Ben Achour & Slim Laghmani eds., 1994) (Fr.) (noting that they are an “exacte négation”
of the pro-election resolutions).
141. See supra Part II.A.2.
142. G.A. Res. 46/137, supra note 132, ¶ 5.
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ing the pouvoir constituant and pouvoir constitué,143 though, this right to
choose does not amount to an automatic right to democracy.
The resolutions, rather, suggest a teleological view of elections and
democracy, upholding the desirability of electoral institutions without
imposing a strict obligation to establish and honor them. In the above
analysis of democratization theories, it has been shown that democratization is a long-term process, not a simple shift from one status to another.144
By using the terms “developing” and “enhancing” to discuss electoral
institutions, the language of these resolutions stresses this process-like
character of democratization.
In addition, several other resolutions and declarations of the international community support this understanding of democratization. A
prime example is General Assembly Resolution 55/96, which was
adopted in 2000.145 Its central purpose is to “call upon states to promote
and consolidate democracy.”146 Thus, the Resolution also uses processoriented terminology by employing the words “promoting” and “consolidating.” The latter is often used in the social sciences to describe the teleological nature of democratization processes.147 Similarly, the term
“consolidation” bolsters the point that in international law democracy is
both a classificatory and a gradual concept. Democratization not only
involves the process leading to a transition to democracy, but also requires subsequent consolidation.
The aforementioned Vienna Declaration of Human Rights also includes a paragraph dedicated to democratization:
The World Conference on Human Rights reaffirms that least developed
countries committed to the process of democratization and economic
reforms, many of which are in Africa, should be supported by the international community in order to succeed in their transition to democracy
and economic development.148

Again, the language focuses on the process of realizing rather than the
status of democracy. Finally, in the U.N. Millennium Declaration, one
can find two statements championing the promotion of democracy or
advocating the development of U.N. Member States’ capacity for democratization.149
143. See supra Part II.A.1.
144. See supra Part I.B.4.
145. G.A. Res. 55/96, supra note 18.
146. Id. ¶ 1.
147. Schedler, supra note 89, at 95.
148. Vienna Declaration, supra note 4, ¶ 9.
149. G.A. Res. 55/2, ¶¶ 24–25 U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 8, 2000) (“We will spare
no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law . . . . We resolve therefore

2008]

THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRATIC TELEOLOGY

61

2. Regional Developments
(a) The Americas
Some of the most extensive guarantees concerning democracy can be
found in the context of the Organization of American States (“OAS”).
Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights150 prescribes
the right to participate in democratic elections. Furthermore, according to
Article 2(b) of the OAS Charter,151 the promotion of democracy is one of
the Organization’s principal objectives. At the start of the 1990s, the
OAS established a mechanism to implement this objective. In June 1991,
the General Assembly of the OAS adopted Resolution 1080, which authorized the OAS Permanent Council to employ coercive measures
against a Member State whose democracy was compromised.152
One year later, the Washington Protocol modified the founding charter.153 Revised Article 9 of the Charter provides for suspending a State’s
membership rights if its elected government has been overthrown by
force. The mechanism governing this suspension is now outlined in
greater detail in Articles 17 through 22 in the Inter-American Democratic
Charter,154 which was adopted in 2001.155
The OAS has applied this sanction mechanism several times. In September 1991, shortly after the adoption of Resolution 1080, it was first
employed in response to Haiti’s president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, being
. . . [t]o strengthen the capacity of all our countries to implement the principles and practices of democracy.”).
150. American Convention, supra note 17.
151. Charter of the Organization of American States art. 2(b), Apr. 30, 1948 1948
T.I.A.S. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
152. O.A.S. Doc. AG/RES 1080 (XXI-O/91) (June 5, 1991) (authorizing the Permanent Council to “devise a set of proposals that will serve as incentives to preserve and
strengthen democratic systems”).
153. Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American States
“Protocol of Washington,” 33 I.L.M 1005 (1994).
154. Inter-American Democratic Charter arts. 17–21, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.P/AG/Res.1
(XXVIII-E/01) (Sept. 11, 2001).
155. See Enrique Lagos & Timothy D. Rudy, The Third Summit of the Americas and
the Thirty-First Session of the OAS General Assembly, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 173 (2002);
Sonia Picado, The Evolution of Democracy and Human Rights in Latin America: A TenYear Perspective, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 28 (2004) (providing a more in-depth discussion
of the Democratic Charter). Although the Democratic Charter is not directly binding as a
resolution of the OAS General Assembly, according to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, the mechanism
in question can be regarded as an “interpretation” of Article 9 of the OAS Charter. See
Enrique Lagos & Timothy D. Rudy, In Defense of Democracy, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 283, 303–05 (2004).
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ousted in a coup. The OAS Permanent Council convened immediately
and condemned the coup, demanding that Aristide be reinstated.156 Three
days later, the OAS suspended trade relations with Haiti and all forms of
non-humanitarian aid.157 Subsequently, the United Nations assumed the
case, and two years after the coup, it finally authorized the United States
to intervene militarily to force the military junta to step down.158
In April 1992, the President of Peru, Alberto Fujimori, staged an autocoup, in which he dissolved the parliament and arrested several opposition members.159 The OAS Permanent Council expressly condemned this
action,160 and the international community suspended loans to Peru. The
international pressure prompted Fujimori to concede the election of a
constitutional assembly in November 1992.161 Nevertheless, the effectiveness of these international measures was limited, as in the end Fujimori
won the elections and maintained power.162
One year later, Guatemala’s president, Serrano Elías, also initiated an
auto-coup, dissolving the parliament, suspending several constitutional
rights, and dismissing the constitutional court.163 In this case, the OAS
initiated sanctions severer than those used against Fujimori.164 The Permanent Council unanimously condemned Serrano’s coup and ultimately
forced him to step down.165
Peru again became the focus of international attention in 2000 when
the OAS sent a mission to Peru to monitor presidential elections.166 The
monitoring mission found itself unable to guarantee the technical minimum standards for counting the votes in the decisive ballot between

156. O.A.S. Doc. CP/RES. 567 (870/91) (Sept. 30, 1991).
157. O.A.S. Doc. MRE/RES. 1/91, Ser. F/V.1 (Oct. 3, 1991).
158. See infra Part II.B.3.b (referring to the case of Haiti in more detail).
159. Picado, supra note 155, at 29.
160. O.A.S. Doc. MRE/RES. 1/92, OES/Ser. F./V.2 (Apr. 13, 1992).
161. Picado, supra note 155, at 29.
162. Tom J. Farer, Collectively Defending Democracy in the Western Hemisphere:
Introduction and Overview, in BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY: COLLECTIVELY DEFENDING DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS 1, 19–20 (1996).
163. Barry Steven Levitt, A Desultory Defense of Democracy: OAS Resolution 1080
and the Inter-American Democratic Charter, 48 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 93, 104
(2006).
164. See id. at 116 (noting that the reason for the different treatment was probably the
fact that the Peruvian people supported Fujimori more than the Guatemalan people supported Serrano).
165. Id. at 105.
166. See OAS Mission for Peru, BBC NEWS, June 6, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/americas/809399.stm.
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Fujimori and his contender, Alejandro Toledo.167 The OAS thus cancelled the mission.168 In its report, the delegation stated that the elections
failed to meet international standards.169 Despite this report, OAS Member States could not agree to condemn Peru on the basis of Resolution
1080.170 The Permanent Council, adopting a compromise, sent a mission
to Peru to investigate the situation in more detail.171 The mission, however,
was not completed because Fujimori stumbled into a corruption scandal
and had to cede power.172
In February 2004, Haiti’s President Aristide was toppled for a second
time.173 Following brief hostilities, Aristide was forced to step down and
flee the country.174 The president of the supreme court, Boniface Alexandre, succeeded Aristide as transitional president.175 The reaction of the
international community was much more lukewarm compared to thirteen
years earlier. Although the OAS General Assembly reacted four months
later, adopting a resolution that called upon Haiti to return to democracy
and condemned the acts of violence since the coup,176 the OAS failed to
authorize formal sanctions or suspend Haiti’s membership rights.177 Most
probably, this mild international reaction was due to Aristide’s weak
legitimacy, considering he won elections in 2000 that were subject to
irregularities.178 Furthermore, many human rights organizations blamed
Aristide for the deteriorating human rights situation and political violence in the country.179 This case suggests that the OAS treats coups
d’état differently. Rather than automatically condemning every coup, the
OAS considers the perceived legitimacy of an ousted head of state to be
a decisive factor.
References to democracy are not limited to the OAS. Legal documents
addressing democracy and elections can also be found in the framework
167. Fujimori Insists Poll ‘Fair,’ BBC NEWS, May 30, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/americas/768893.stm.
168. Id.
169. Toledo Withdraws from Peru Election, BBC NEWS, May 22, 2000, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/americas/759691.stm.
170. OAS Mission for Peru, supra note 166.
171. Id.
172. Michele Wucker, Haiti: So Many Missteps, 21 WORLD POL’Y J. 41, 41–42 (2004).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. David S. Berry, Non-Democratic Transitions: Reactions of the OAS and CARICOM
to Aristide’s Departure, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 249, 256 (2005).
176. O.A.S. Doc. AG/RES. 2058 (XXXIV-O/04) (June 8, 2004).
177. Berry, supra note 175.
178. Wucker, supra note 172, at 41, 45.
179. Id. at 47.
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of some Latin American regional organizations. In 1998, the Member
States of the Andean Community (“CAN”) adopted the Andean Community Commitment to Democracy180 as a legally binding additional protocol
to the founding statute of the CAN, the Cartagena Agreement.181 In addition to expressing a commitment to democracy in Article 1, the protocol
sets up a sanction mechanism in Article 4.182 If the democratic order is
disrupted in violation of Article 2, this mechanism provides for coercive
measures ranging from the suspension of membership rights to ineligibility for loans from the financial institutions of the CAN.183 Furthermore,
Article 13 of the Human Rights Charter of the CAN prescribes a right to
democracy, which is further specified in Articles 14 through 18.184
A similar mechanism was included in the framework of the Mercado
Común del Sur (“MERCOSUR”). In 1996, the Member States adopted a
declaration on democracy stating that the establishment and maintenance
of democratic institutions are fundamental preconditions for cooperation
with the MERCOSUR.185 Violations may lead to the suspension of
membership rights.186 With the Protocol of Ushuaia, this mechanism has
been transformed into an international treaty, applying to Bolivia and
Chile in addition to the member signatories.187
Article 3 of the Protocol of Tegucigalpa, the founding statute of the
System of Central American Integration (“SICA”),188 identifies the promotion and strengthening of democracy as one of the organization’s
principal objectives.189 In 1995, this objective was reaffirmed in the
180. Additional Protocol to the Cartagena Agreement: “Andean Community Commitment to Democracy,” Aug. 7, 1998, available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/INGLES/
normativa/democracy.htm.
181. Official Codified Text of the Cartagena Agreement, May 26, 1969, 28 I.L.M.
1165, amended by the Quito Protocol (May 12, 1987).
182. Additional Protocol to the Cartagena Agreement, supra note 180, arts. 1, 4.
183. Id. art. 4.
184. Andean Charter for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights arts. 13–18, Jul.
26, 2002, available at http://www.comunidadandina.org/INGLES/documentos/documents/and
ean_charter.htm.
185. Declaración Presidencial sobre Compromiso Democrático en el MERCOSUR, June
25, 1996, ¶ 1, available at http://www.mercosursalud.org/espanhol/mercosul/historico/Decl_
compr_Pres.htm.
186. Id. ¶ 4.
187. Protocolo de Ushuaia sobre Compromiso Democrático en el MERCOSUR, la
Republica de Bolivia y la Republica de Chile, July 24, 1998, available at http://www.merc
osur.int/msweb/portal%20intermediario/es/index.htm (follow “Protocolo de Ushuaia” hyperlink).
188. Sistema de Integración Centroamericana.
189. Protocolo de Tegucigalpa a la Carta de la Organización de Estados Centroamericanos (ODECA) art. 3, Dec. 13, 1991, 1695 U.N.T.S. 382.

2008]

THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRATIC TELEOLOGY

65

Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central America.190 In addition to noting that the SICA is based on the principles of democracy
and the rule of law, Article 1 of the Treaty obligates States to elect governments through universal and free elections.191
(b) Europe
As in the Americas, the institutional design of European international
organizations shows a strong commitment to democracy. Article 3 of the
first additional protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights192
prescribes a right to participate in democratic elections. In contrast to the
OAS, however, the principle of democracy has not been enshrined in the
founding Statute of the Council of Europe (“Statute”).193 Rather, Article
3 of the Statute provides that Member States “must accept the principles
of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the objective of the Council as
specified in Chapter I.”194 Although missing in the operative part of the
Statute, democracy is mentioned in the preamble. There, democracy is
described as originating from the “spiritual and moral values which are
the common heritage of the [European] peoples.”195 According to Article
1(a) of the Statute, fulfilling these values is one of the main objectives of
the Council.196
In practice, a State’s level of democratization has had an influence on
its membership in the Council of Europe. When the parliamentary democracy in Greece was succeeded by a military dictatorship in 1967, the
European Council’s Parliamentary Assembly recommended the exclusion
of Greece to the Committee of Ministers.197 Greece responded by withdrawing from the Council of Europe on December 12, 1969.198 Similarly,
the Council only admitted Portugal and Spain as members after each
190. Tratado Marco de Seguridad Democrática in Centroamérica, Dec. 15, 1995, 2007
U.N.T.S. 191, available at http://www.sieca.org.gt/publico/Reuniones_Presidentes/xvii/tratad
o1.htm
191. Id. art. 1.
192. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 3, Mar. 20, 1952, Europ.T.S. No. 9.
193. Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, Europ. T.S. No. 1.
194. Id. art. 3
195. Id. pmbl.
196. Id. art. 1(a).
197. Council of Europe, Recommendation 547 of the Consultative Assembly (Jan. 30,
1969) 17 Eur. Y.B. 277–79 (1969).
198. See Notification of the Greek Government Denouncing the Statute of the Council
of Europe (Dec. 17, 1969) 17 Eur. Y.B. 327–29 (1969).
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country reinstated democratic governments.199 And after the dissolution
of the Soviet Union, Russia’s admission to the Council was delayed for
several years because, inter alia, a report of experts testified that Russia
had failed to meet “the Council of Europe’s standards.”200
In the Charter of Paris, enacted during the Conference for Security and
Cooperation in Europe in 1990, European heads of state declared that
democracy is the only admissible form of government.201 Although the
Charter of Paris does not have immediate binding force, consistent with
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,202 it can be
used as a tool to interpret existing obligations such as those of the Council of Europe.203
The supranational institution in which the democracy principle is the
most developed, but also the most widely criticized, is the European Union.204 According to Article 6(1) of the Treaty on the European Union,
democracy is one of the EU’s fundamental principles.205 It is part of the
acquis communautaire, which every potential member must observe in
order to be admitted to the European Union.206 Moreover, Article 7 of the

199. YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL MONITORING OF PLEBISCITES, REFERENDA AND
NATIONAL ELECTIONS 249 (1994).
200. Ronald St. J. Macdonald, The Entry of New Member States into the Council of
Europe, 91 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L PROC. 523, 523–24 (1997).
201. Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 193 (1991).
202. See supra note 155.
203. Jochen Abr. Frowein, Demokratie und Völkerrecht in Europa [Democracy and
Public International Law in Europe], in VÖLKERRECHT ZWISCHEN NORMATIVEM ANSPRUCH UND POLITISCHER REALITÄT. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR KARL ZEMANEK ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG 365, 368 (Konrad Ginther et al. eds., 1994) (F.R.G.).
204. See, e.g., Renaud Dehousse, Beyond Representative Democracy: Constitutionalism in a Polycentric Polity, in EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE 135
(J.H.H. Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003); Augustín José Menéndez, Between Laeken
and the Deep Blue Sea: An Assessment of the Draft Constitutional Treaty from a Deliberative-Democratic Standpoint, 11 EUR. PUB. L. 105 (2005); Anne Peters, European
Democracy After the 2003 Convention, 41 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 37 (2004); Niels Petersen, The Democracy Concept of the European Union: Coherent Constitutional Principle
or Prosaic Declaration of Intent?, in THE UNITY OF THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION 97
(Philipp Dann & Michal Rynkowski eds., 2006) (proposing different conceptualizations
of the democracy principle in the European Union); Joseph H.H. Weiler et al., European
Democracy and Its Critique, 18 W. EUR. POL. 4 (1995).
205. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Mar. 10, 2001, art. 6,
2002 O.J. (C 325), as amended by the Treaty of Nice (Mar. 10, 2001).
206. Id. art. 49.
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Treaty provides for a sanction mechanism whereby certain membership
rights may be suspended if Article 6(1) of the Treaty is violated.207
(c) Africa
Regarding the African Union (“AU”), Article 13 of the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“Banjul Charter”) does not explicitly
mention a right to elections. 208 It does, however, guarantee a right to participate in public affairs.209 According to the African Commission on
Human Rights (“African Commission”), this participation involves legitimating a sovereign power through elections.210 Articles 3(g) and 4(m) of
the AU Charter also identify the promotion of and respect for democratic
principles and institutions as fundamental objectives of the AU.211 Moreover, the AU as well as its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity
(“OAU”), have established protection mechanisms against coups d’état.
The starting point was a 1994 resolution of the African Commission,
which condemned military overthrows of government and appealed to
military regimes to transfer their power to elected governments.212
In practice, the turning point was the ousting of Ahmed Kabbah in
Sierra Leone in 1997.213 The OAU supported the military intervention of
the Economic Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”)214 and
207. Id. art. 7. For a detailed discussion of the sanction mechanisms established by
Article 7 of the EU Treaty, see AMARYLLIS VERHOEVEN, THE EUROPEAN UNION IN
SEARCH OF A DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 349–54 (2002).
208. Organization of African Unity: Banjul Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights,
Jun. 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58, available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/
Treaties/Text/Banjul%20Charter.pdf [hereinafter Banjul Charter]. However, it should be
noted that Article 13 discusses the right of every citizen to “participate freely in the
government of his country, either directly or through freely chosen representatives in
accordance with the provision of the law.” Id. art. 13.
209. Id.
210. Constitutional Rights Project and Civil Liberties Organisation/Nigeria ¶¶ 49–50,
Doc. ACHPR/102/93 (Oct. 31, 2008), reprinted in African Commission on Human
Rights and Peoples’ Rights, Twelfth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (1998–1999) 45, Doc. AHG/215 (XXV) (1998), available at
http://www.achpr.org/english/activity_reports/activity12_en.pdf.
211. Constitutive Act of the African Union arts. 3(g), 4(m), O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/2315
(July 11, 2000), available at http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.htm [hereinafter Act of the AU].
212. Resolution on the Military, OAU Doc. ACHPR/Res.10(XVI)94 (Nov. 3, 1994),
available at http://www.achpr.org/english/_doc_target/documentation.html?../resolutions/
resolution15_en.html.
213. Paul D. Williams, From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and
Development of the African Unions Security Culture, 106 AFR. AFF. 253, 272 (2007).
214. See infra Part II.B.3.b for a discussion of this intervention.
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called upon the international community not to recognize the junta of
Paul Koroma.215 The OAU reacted similarly towards military coups in
the Comoros, Ivory Coast, and Niger, refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of rebel governments in these states.216
This position was translated into a formal legal rule during the foundation of the AU. Article 4 of the AU Charter condemns unconstitutional
changes of government.217 Correspondingly, Article 30 of the AU Charter allows a State’s membership rights to be suspended where the government has come to power by “unconstitutional means.”218 Reading
Article 4 in conjunction with Article 30 suggests that the latter permits
such sanctions only when an elected regime has been ousted.
In a 2000 declaration (“Declaration”), AU Member States further elaborated upon this sanction mechanism.219 The Declaration provides for a
six-month period in which the implicated State has the opportunity to
restore its constitutional order, and during this time, the AU can suspend
its right to participate in the policy-making organs of the AU.220 If it does
not comply with this obligation, the AU may then institute sanctions
against the noncompliant State.221 The Declaration contains a nonexhaustive list of possible sanctions, ranging from denying visas for illegitimate
government officials, to limiting government-to-government contacts, to
restricting trade with other AU countries.222
This mechanism has been applied in several cases. In 2003, the AU
barred the Central African Republic from taking part in its organs after
military forces overthrew the elected president, Ange-Félix Patassé.223
The AU allowed the country to resume its participation following presidential elections held in 2005.224 Likewise, when Faure Gnassingbé captured power in Togo by military force after the death of his father in
215. OAU Council of Ministers, Doc. CM/Dec. 356 (LXVI) (May 28–31, 1997).
216. Tiyanjana Maluwa, The Constitutive Act of the African Union and InstitutionBuilding in Postcolonial Africa, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 157, 165 (2003).
217. Act of the AU, supra note 211, art. 4.
218. Id.
219. Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes
of Government, O.A.U. Doc. AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI) (July 10–12, 2000), available at
http://www.africa-union.org/Special_Programs/CSSDCA/cssdca-solemndeclaration.pdf.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. A.U. Doc. Central Organ/MEC/AMB/Comm. (XC), ¶ 4 (Mar. 17, 2003), available
at http://www.africa-union.org/News_Events/Communiqu%C3%A9s/Communique_20_
Eng_17mar03.pdf.
224. A.U. Doc. PSC/PR/Comm. (XXXIII)–(ii), ¶ 2 (June 24, 2005), available at
http://www.iss.co.za/Af/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdf/centorg/PSC/comm33.pdf.
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February 2005, in addition to condemning the coup and welcoming the
sanctions that ECOWAS initiated, the AU suspended Togo’s membership rights.225 This pressure prompted Gnassingbé to step down and hold
elections, which he ultimately won.226 Despite doubts about the legitimacy
of Gnassingbé’s election,227 the Peace and Security Council readmitted
Togo’s government.228
This last example indicates that the current practice of the AU is problematic in two respects: on the one hand, its sanctions are too farreaching, and on the other hand, as in the case of Togo, they are not
inclusive enough.229 Regarding the over-inclusiveness of sanctions, military coups have been condemned, notwithstanding the legitimacy of
ousted regimes. There is thus a danger that the mechanism is a reinforcer
of the status quo rather than a catalyst for democratization.230 Mauritania’s President, Maaouya Sid Ahmed Ould Taya, for example, whose
legitimacy was questionable at best, was overthrown in a bloodless coup
in August 2005.231 Although the military government announced that it
would hold elections within two years and exclude its own participation,
the AU condemned the coup and subjected Mauritania to sanctions.232
However, some African politicians voiced dissent. The South African
Ambassador to Mauritania, for example, declared: “[although] the principle of the AU is not to agree with coups . . . we believe we shall not
have one policy to fit every situation.”233 The sanctions against Maurita-

225. A.U. Doc. PSC/PR/Comm. (XXV), ¶ 3–4 (Feb. 25, 2005) available at
http://www.issafrica.org/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_Union/pdfs/centorg/PSC/2005/25com.pdf.
226. Doubts Hang over Togo Election, BBC NEWS, Apr. 29, 2005, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/4497787.stm.
227. See id.
228. A.U. Doc. PSC/PR/Comm. (XXX), ¶ 3 (May 27, 2005), available at http://www.
issafrica.org/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/centorg/PSC/2005/30comm.pdf.
229. Williams, supra note 213, at 274.
230. See Djacoba Liva Tehindrazanarivelo, Les sanctions de l’union africaine contre
les coups d’état et autres changements anticonstitutionnels de gouvernement: potentialités et mesures de renforcement [The African Union’s Sanctions Against Coups d’État
and Other Unconstitutional Changes of Government: Efficacy and Enforcement Strategies], 12 AFR. Y.B. INT’L L. 255, 280 (2004) (Neth.).
231. Mauritania Officers “Seize Power,” BBC NEWS, Aug. 4, 2005, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/4741243.stm.
232. A.U. Doc. PSC/PR/Stat. (XXXVI)-(ii) (Aug. 4, 2005), available at http://www.
africa-union.org/psc/36th/36th%20Stat%20Mauritania%20PSC%20Eng.pdf.
233. AU Seeks Mauritanian Junta Talks, BBC NEWS, Aug. 9, 2005, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4135350.stm.
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nia were nonetheless lifted only after presidential elections were held in
the spring of 2007.234
However, there are also positive signs. In two other cases, the AU
issued formal condemnations without further sanctions in response to
coups against regimes of doubtful legitimacy. The December 1999 military coup against a corrupt regime in the Ivory Coast was publicly criticized, but the transitional government was recognized shortly thereafter.235
When President Kumba Yalla was ousted in Guinea-Bissau in 2003, after
dissolving the parliament and adopting several dictatorial decrees, the
AU only denounced the coup.236
At the same time, the AU has been very reluctant to act when it comes
to other constitutional infringements such as falsifying elections, amending constitutions to consolidate more power, or permitting additional
terms in office.237 A recent example is the March 2008 presidential election in Zimbabwe. Although the legitimacy of the reelection of Robert
Mugabe was questionable at best, the AU General Assembly only
adopted a resolution encouraging the opposing parties to enter into a
constructive dialogue and failed to impose any sanctions.238
Some regional organizations in Africa have established mechanisms
similar to those of the AU. The 1991 Declaration of Political Principles
of the Economic Community of West African States asserts:
We believe in the liberty of the individual and in his inalienable right to
participate by means of free and democratic processes in the framing of
the society in which he lives. We will therefore strive to encourage and
promote in each of our countries, political pluralism and those representative institutions and guarantees for personal safety and freedom
under the law that are our common heritage.239

234. A.U. Doc. PSC/PR/Comm. (LXXVI), ¶ 3–7 (Apr. 10, 2007), available at http://www.
iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/REP76.PDF?link_id=22&slink_id
=4297&link_type=12&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3.
235. Christof Hartmann, Demokratie als Leitbild der afrikanischen Staatengemeinschaft? Zur Theorie und Praxis demokratischer Schutzklauseln in der Afrikanischen Union [Democracy as a Model for the African Community of States? On Theory and Practice of Democratic Protection Clauses in the African Union], 38 VERFASSUNG UND RECHT
IN ÜBERSEE 201, 218 (2005) (F.R.G.).
236. A.U. Doc. Central Organ/MEC/AMB/Comm. (XCV) (Sept. 18, 2003).
237. Hartmann, supra note 235, at 219–20; Williams, supra note 213, at 274–75.
238. A.U. Doc. Assembly/AU/Res.1 (XI) (July 1, 2008), available at http://www.
africa-union.org/root/au/Conferences/2008/june/summit/dec/ASSEMBLY%20DECISIO
NS%20193%20-%20207%20(XI).pdf.
239. Declaration of Political Principles of the ECOWAS, Doc. A/DCL.1/7/91, ¶ 6 (Jul.
6, 1991).
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The essence of this declaration was incorporated into the 1993 Treaty
of ECOWAS.240 Subsections (h) and (j) of Article 4 provide that the right
to participate in the conduct of government and promote democracy is
one of the organization’s fundamental principles.241 Moreover, in accordance with Article 58(2)(g), the organization is to offer its support in the
holding of elections upon a Member State’s request.242 The ECOWAS
reaffirmed these principles in the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance,243 which explicitly emphasizes the obligation to hold free, fair,
and transparent elections.244
Furthermore, in Article 4(c) of the Charter of the South African Development Community (“SADC”), the promotion of democracy is enshrined
as one of the SADC’s guiding principles.245 According to Article 5(1),
the organization’s objectives feature, inter alia, the promotion of common political values “transmitted through institutions which are democratic, legitimate and effective,”246 as well as the “consolida[tion], defen[se] and mainten[ance] of democracy.”247 The SADC Principles and
Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, adopted in August 2004
during the organization’s summit in Mauritius, also support these principles.248
(d) Evaluation
The analysis of emerging regional commitments to democracy presents
a heterogeneous picture. In the Americas and Europe, a democracy principle has been established under regional customary law.249 Both human
240. Economic Community of West African States Revised Treaty, Jul. 24, 1993, 35
I.L.M. 660.
241. Id. art. 4(h)–(j).
242. Id. art. 58(2)(g).
243. Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, Doc. A/SP1/12/01 (Dec. 22, 2001),
available at http://www.ecowas.int.
244. Id. art. 1.
245. Treaty of the Southern African Development Community art. 4(c), Aug. 17, 1992,
available at http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/120.
246. Id. art. 5(1)(b).
247. Id. art. 5(1)(c).
248. SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, Aug. 2004,
http://www.sadc.int/english/documents/political_affairs/index.php.
249. On the democracy principle in Europe, see Frowein, supra note 203. On the democracy principle in the Americas, see Dexter S. Boniface, Is There a Democratic Norm
in the Americas? An Analysis of the Organization of American States, 8 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 365 (2002) (analyzing events supporting the argument that a customary
democracy principle is developing in the Americas); Dinah Shelton, Representative Democracy and Human Rights in the Western Hemisphere, 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. 353 (1991)
(discussing the OAS’s emphasis on democratic institutions).
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rights treaties and documents of the regional political organizations contain extensive electoral and democratic guarantees. American and European regional bodies have also developed effective sanction mechanisms
against States that fail to meet democratic standards. In Europe especially,
these sanctions not only concentrate on the central element of democracy—elections—but also strive to implement a more substantive vision of
democracy.
With regard to Africa, locating a coherent democratic principle is more
difficult. Although the AU Charter has deemed democracy one of its vital
objectives,250 and the Banjul Charter prescribes a right to participate in
public affairs,251 many governments in Africa remain undemocratic.
However, instead of actively promoting democracy, the established sanction mechanisms exclusively address regressions in the process of democratization, which supports the argument that the democracy principle
must be read in a teleological manner rather than in a strict sense.
3. Democracy and the Use of Force
Military intervention in the name of democracy has attracted the most
attention in the literature on democracy in international law. The following analysis focuses on five possible precedents for the use of force to
promote democracy. In doing so, this section compares the unilateral
military interventions of the United States in Grenada, Panama, and Iraq
with the U.N. Security Council-backed interventions in Haiti and Sierra
Leone.
(a) Unilateral Interventions in Grenada, Panama, and Iraq
In response to a coup d’état against the government of Maurice Bishop,
U.S. troops invaded Grenada on October 25, 1983, with the support of
neighboring Caribbean States.252 Three days after the invasion, the U.S.
military succeeded in overthrowing the military council, which had come
to power after the coup.253 In the ensuing debate among legal scholars on
the legality of the U.S. intervention, some argued that restoring democracy was a sufficient legal justification.254 However, there are several facts
250. Act of the AU, supra note 211, art. 3.
251. Banjul Charter, supra note 208, art. 13.
252. John Burgess, Most Residents of Nearby Barbados Appear to Support Grenada
Invasion, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1983, at A15.
253. Loren Jenkins, U.S. Forces Seize Fugitive Leader of Grenadan Coup: Barbados
Says Austin Flown to USS Guam, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1983, at A1.
254. ROTH, supra note 131, at 309 (noting positive developments following the invasion of Grenada and suggesting that the case of Grenada serves as a positive precedent).
See also FERNANDO R. TESÓN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW
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that undercut this position. First, Bishop himself attained power not by
democratic means, but through a coup d’état in 1979.255 Second, the U.S.
administration did not attempt to justify the intervention on the grounds
of restoring democratic order.256 The opinions of academic commentators
alone are insufficient for an opinio juris.257 Finally, and most importantly,
the U.N. General Assembly condemned the intervention as illegal by an
overwhelming majority.258 While resolutions of the General Assembly
are certainly not directly binding, they are an expression of opinio juris
that the U.S. invasion cannot be regarded as a precedent for a right to
pro-democratic intervention.259
The U.S. offensive in Panama is a second possible precedent for the
idea that democracy may justify military intervention.260 On December
20, 1989, the U.S. army invaded Panama in order to overthrow the regime of Manuel Noriega and capture the head of state himself. This time,
President George H.W. Bush explicitly justified the action on the basis of
protecting democracy, in addition to citing the need to protect U.S. citizens, combat drug trafficking, and secure implementation of the Panama
Canal treaties.261 However, the U.N. General Assembly again condemned

AND MORALITY 258 (3rd ed. 2005); William Michael Reisman, Editorial, Coercion and
Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 642 (1984) (defending unilateral intervention by arguing that restrictions of Article 2(4) are possible
because of the U.N. Security Council’s lack of effectiveness in many circumstances).
255. L. Doswald-Beck, The Legality of the United States Intervention in Grenada, 24
INDIAN J. INT’L L. 200, 201 (1984).
256. Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman, “You, the People”: Pro-Democratic Intervention in International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 123, at 259, 273; Oscar Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion,
78 AM. J. INT’L L. 645, 648 (1984).
257. Wouters et al., supra note 117, at 169.
258. G.A. Res. 38/7, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/38/7 (Nov. 2, 1983) (“Deeply deplor[ing]
the armed intervention in Grenada, which constitutes a flagrant violation of international
law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of that [s]tate”). The
vote was 108-9-27. Byers & Chesterman, supra note 256, at 273 n.64.
259. SCOTT DAVIDSON, GRENADA: A STUDY IN POLITICS AND THE LIMITS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 147 (1987); Byers & Chesterman, supra note 256, at 274.
260. TESÓN, supra note 254, at 269; William Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and Fledging Democracies, 19 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 794, 800–01 (1995); Abraham D. Sofaer, The Legality of the United States Action in Panama, 29 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 281, 288–91 (1991). But see Anthony D’Amato, The Invasion of Panama
Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 516, 519 (1990) (referring to the
human rights violations of the Noriega regime and explicitly rejecting the possibility of a
pro-democratic intervention).
261. George Bush, President, Address to the Nation Announcing U.S. Military Action in
Panama, ¶ 2 (Dec. 20, 1989), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=17965.
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the intervention by a clear majority.262 Therefore, the intervention in Panama should likewise not serve as evidence of a right to democracy in
international law.263
The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 is the most recent case in
which regime change was invoked as a justification for war.264 In his
State of the Union address on January 28, 2003, President George W.
Bush declared: “And tonight I have a message for the brave and oppressed people of Iraq: Your enemy is not surrounding your country—
your enemy is ruling your country. And the day he and his regime are
removed from power will be the day of your liberation.”265 Among the
political considerations that finally led to the war, Iraq’s democratization
was a major factor.266 It is telling, though, that in official legal justifications for the war, neither the United States nor Great Britain mentioned
regime change as the principle reason.267 Instead, they justified the intervention by interpreting Resolutions 678,268 687,269 and 1441270 of the
262. G.A. Res. 44/240, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/240 (Dec. 29, 1989) (“Strongly deplor[ing] the intervention in Panama by the armed forces of the United States of America,
which constitutes a flagrant violation of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of states”). The vote was 75-20-40. Byers & Chesterman,
supra note 256, at 275 n.79.
263. Byers & Chesterman, supra note 256, at 275; Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panama Under International Law: A Gross Violation, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 293,
298 (1991); Ved P. Nanda, The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama Under
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 494, 500 (1990); John Quigley, The Legality of the
United States Invasion of Panama, 15 YALE J. INT’L L. 276, 303–06 (1990); Sarah A.
Rumage, Panama and the Myth of Humanitarian Intervention in U.S. Foreign Policy:
Neither Legal Nor Moral, Neither Just Nor Right, 10 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 54–57
(1993); Oscar Schachter, Is There a Right to Overthrow an Illegitimate Regime?, in LE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU SERVICE DE LA PAIX, DE LA JUSTICE ET DU DEVELOPPEMENT.
MÉLANGES MICHEL VIRALLY. 423, 426–28 (Jean Boulouis & René-Jean Dupuy eds.,
1991).
264. See TESÓN, supra note 254, at 392 (considering humanitarian intervention as the
primary justification of the invasion for Iraq); Davis Brown, Iraq and the 800-Pound
Gorilla Revisited: Good and Bad Faith, and Humanitarian Intervention, 28 HASTINGS
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2004); Robert F. Turner, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Legal and
Policy Considerations, 27 HARV. J. L. & PUBL. POL’Y 765, 778 (2004). However, all the
above authors emphasize the human rights violations of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Implicit is the position that the totalitarian form of government alone is not sufficient to
justify an intervention.
265. Press Release, President George W. Bush, President Delivers “State of the Union” (Jan. 28, 2003).
266. James Kurth, Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq, 50 ORBIS 87, 97 (2005).
267. Dino Kritsiotis, Arguments of Mass Confusion, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 233, 271, 273–
74 (2004).
268. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
269. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 8, 1991).

2008]

THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRATIC TELEOLOGY

75

U.N. Security Council respectively.271 Nonetheless, a considerable part
of the international community condemned the intervention. Among its
opponents were Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, and Russia.272 Accordingly, the Iraq War also cannot be regarded as support for
the emergence of an international democracy principle.273
(b) Collective Interventions in Haiti and Sierra Leone
In the search for precedents that ground such a norm, collective interventions authorized by international institutions are more promising indicators than the unilateral interventions examined thus far. Many legal
scholars argue that the 1991 intervention in Haiti, which was authorized
by the U.N. Security Council, serves as a paradigmatic precedent.274 In
1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected as Haiti’s president with sixtyseven percent of the votes.275 The United Nations276 and the OAS277
270. S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8, 2002).
271. Compare Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of
America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/2003/351 (Mar. 20, 2003), with Statement by the Attorney General, Lord
Goldsmith, in Answer to a Parliamentary Question (Mar. 18, 2003), available at http://www.
fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007
029391629&a=KArticle&aid=1047661460790.
272. Elizabeth Bumiller, White House Letter: Who’s Cool at the Group of 8 Meeting
It’s All in Bush’s Gestures, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2003, available at http://query.nytimes.
com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0DE2DB1230F931A35755C0A9659C8B63&sec=&spon=
&pagewanted=1; Opposition to Iraq War Widens, BBC NEWS, Jan. 23, 2003, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2688117.stm; Tracy Wilkinson & Sebastian Rotella, Al Qaeda May Be Widening War of Terror, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 2003, at A1.
273. Michael Bothe, Der Irak-Krieg und das völkerrechtliche Gewaltverbot [The Iraq
War and the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Public International Law], 41 ARCHIV
DES VÖLKERRECHTS 255, 258 (2003) (F.R.G.); Richard A. Falk, What Future for the UN
Charter System of War Prevention?, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 590, 597 (2003); Mary Ellen
O’Connell, La doctrine américaine et l’intervention en Iraq [The American Doctrine and
the Intervention in Iraq], 49 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 3, 12–14
(2003) (Fr); Andreas Paulus, The War Against Iraq and the Future of International Law:
Hegemony or Pluralism?, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 691, 711 (2004); Jason Pedigo, Rogue
States, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Terrorism: Was Security Council Approval
Necessary for the Invasion of Iraq?, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 199, 223 (2004).
274. TESÓN, supra note 254, at 307–17; Escudero Espinosa, supra note 94, at 375;
Morton H. Halperin & Kristen Lomasney, Guaranteeing Democracy: A Review of the
Record, 9 J. DEM. 134, 138 (1998); Kokoroko, supra note 117, at 52; William Michael
Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 123, at 239, 248.
275. For a detailed account, see Christina M. Cerna, The Case of Haiti Before the Organization of American States, 86 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 378 (1992).
276. G.A. Res. 45/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/2 (Oct. 10, 1990).
277. A. Schanchetimes, A Real Choice for Haiti’s Voters, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1990.
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monitored this election at Haiti’s request. On September 29, 1991, the
military overthrew Aristide.278 Though not responding immediately, in
June 1993, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 841, which
imposed economic sanctions on Haiti.279 As a result, Haiti’s military regime concluded the so-called Governors Islands Agreement, in which it
conceded the reinstatement of Aristide to power.280 However, the implementation of the Agreement failed when members of the junta exercised
force against Aristide partisans in the autumn of 1993. In response, the
Security Council set up a naval blockade281 and continued the economic
sanctions.282 On July 31, 1994, it adopted Resolution 940, which permitted
all U.N. Member States to use force to reinstall the legitimate government in Haiti.283 On September 18, 1994, just hours before a multinational troop under U.S. leadership was scheduled to land in Haiti, former
U.S. President Jimmy Carter, with the support of Senator Sam Nunn and
General Colin Powell, convinced the junta to cede power to Aristide and
leave the country.284
Several authors have refused to recognize this case as setting a
precedent for collective pro-democratic intervention, arguing that
through its actions, the Security Council was primarily addressing the
protection of peace and security in the region.285 The response of the
United Nations, however, should be examined within the context of the
Security Council’s new activism during the 1990s. In a series of resolutions, the body broadly interpreted the notion of peace and security in
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The Security Council held that peace
and security do not simply mean the absence of the use of military force.
According to the Council, these two terms may be invoked in the case of

278. Julia Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping—Conflict Resolution Through
State-Building and Democracy Promotion in Haiti, 10 MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. L. 465,
495 (2006).
279. S.C. Res. 841, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (June 16, 1993).
280. The Secretary-General, The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti:
Report of the Secretary General ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/47/975, S/26063 (July 12, 1993) (including the text of the Governor’s Island Agreement)
281. S.C. Res. 875, U.N. Doc. S/RES/875 (Oct. 16, 1993).
282. S.C. Res. 873, U.N. Doc. S/RES/873 (Oct. 13, 1993).
283. S.C. Res. 940, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994).
284. Jason B. Johnson, Leading Junta Figure Flees the County, BOSTON HERALD, Oct.
5, 1994, at 4.
285. BARDO FASSBENDER, UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM AND THE RIGHT OF VETO: A
CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 218 (1998); Byers & Chesterman, supra note 256, at 287.
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internal crises, such as those in Rwanda and Somalia.286 While formally
respecting the text of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council, with overwhelming support from the legal literature,287 expanded its authority to
cope with the new world order that emerged after the end of the Cold
War. Thus, despite the reference to peace and security in the region,
Resolution 940 was clearly focused on restoring internal order in Haiti.288
Moreover, some scholars have doubted the competence of the U.N.
Security Council to intervene for the purpose of reinstating democratic
order,289 while others have argued that the case of Haiti cannot be generalized because of the specific regional context.290 Some commentators
have even maintained that the general human rights situation in Haiti291
or the violation of the Governors Islands Agreement justified the Security Council resolution.292 However, these objections cannot account for
the fact that the restoration of democracy was the explicit objective of
Resolution 940. This objective is expressed in its preamble:
“[r]eaffirming that the goal of the international community remains the
286. See Hermann-Josef Blanke, Menschenrechte als völkerrechtliche Interventionstitel [Human Rights as a Justification for Intervention Under International Law], 36
ARCHIV DES VÖLKERRECHTS 257, 278–80 (1998) (F.R.G.).
287. TESÓN, supra note 254, at 279; Blanke, supra note 286; Antonio Cassese, Ex
Iniuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 26–27
(1999); Richard B. Lillich, The Role of the UN Security Council in Protecting Human
Rights in Crisis Situations: UN Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War World,
3 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (1995).
288. TESÓN, supra note 254, at 312; Lois E. Fielding, Taking the Next Step in the Development of New Human Rights: The Emerging Right of Humanitarian Assistance to
Restore Democracy, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 329, 366–69 (1995); Mary Ellen
O’Connell, Regulating the Use of Force in the 21st Century: The Continuing Importance
of State Autonomy, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 473, 487–88 (1997).
289. Byers & Chesterman, supra note 256, at 290–92; Douglas Lee Donoho, Evolution
or Expediency: The United Nations Response to the Disruption of Democracy, 29
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 329, 365–67 (1996); Michael J. Glennon, Sovereignty and Community After Haiti: Rethinking the Collective Use of Force, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 70, 72 (1995).
290. Olivier Corten, La résolution 940 du Conseil de sécurité autorisant une intervention militaire en Haiti: L’émergence d’un principe de légitimité démocratique en droit
international? [Security Council Resolution 940 Authorizing a Military Intervention in
Haiti: The Emergence of a Democratic Legitimacy Principle in International Law?], 6
EUR. J. INT’L L. 116, 129 (1995); Leininger, supra note 278, at 489 (arguing that the intervention in Haiti should not serve as a global precedent because of the specific regional
context).
291. Lillich, supra note 287, at 10. See also KARIN VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRACY BY
FORCE: US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 98–99 (2000) (noting the human rights violations committed by the Cedras regime).
292. Corten, supra note 290, at 126.
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restoration of democracy in Haiti and the prompt return of the legitimately elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, within the framework of the
Governors Island Agreement.”293 Also, supporting the legitimate government of Haiti plays an important role in its operative part:
1. [The Security Council welcomes] the report of the Secretary-General
of 15 July 1994 (S/1994/828) and takes note of his support for action
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in order to
assist the legitimate Government of Haiti in the maintenance of public
order;
[…]
4. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, [the
Security Council] authorizes Member States to form a multinational
force under unified command and control and, in this framework, to use
all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military
leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the
prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration
of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit implementation of the Governors Island Agreement, on the understanding
that the cost of implementing this temporary operation will be borne by
the participating Member States . . . .294

Although the preamble also refers to the human rights situation in Haiti,295 human rights violations are not the focus of the operative part of the
Resolution, as it concentrates on re-establishing the legitimate order.296
Furthermore, the reference to the Governors Islands Agreement itself is
inessential. It is implausible that the Security Council would have implemented an agreement between a de facto regime and a de jure government irrespective of the latter’s content. The Governors Islands
Agreement was only implemented because the goals of the Agreement
were to restore democratic order to the country. Finally, with regard to
the competence of the Security Council, normative concerns are irrele293. S.C. Res. 940, supra note 283.
294. Id. (emphasis added).
295. Id. (“Gravely concerned by the significant further deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Haiti, in particular the continuing escalation by the illegal de facto regime of systematic violations of civil liberties, the desperate plight of Haitian refugees
and the recent expulsion of the staff of the International Civilian Mission, which was
condemned in its Presidential statement of July 12, 1994.”) (internal parentheses omitted).
296. See, e.g., Corten, supra note 290, at 127 (emphasizing that, in terms of gravity
and intensity, the atrocities in Haiti cannot be compared to those committed in Bosnia,
Rwanda, or Somalia).
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vant when examining practice and opinio juris concerning democracy.297
The crucial point here is that the Security Council Resolution is an indicator of the international community’s reception of the intervention.
Nevertheless, the scope of the Haiti precedent is limited.298 The intervention addressed the restoration of a disrupted, preexisting constitutional order. It cannot be regarded, therefore, as an indicator of a universal
democracy principle. However, it does fit into the patterns already observed in the context of General Assembly resolutions. If the democracy
principle in international law is teleological and process-oriented, then
countries are indeed not obliged to turn into democracies overnight.
Teleology, though, prohibits setbacks in the process of democratization.
If collective interventions, such as the intervention in Haiti, occur after
coups d’état against elected governments, this practice confirms the principle of democratic teleology.
The intervention of Nigeria and ECOWAS in Sierra Leone further
supports this argument. In Sierra Leone, a country plagued by civil war,
the parties to the conflict signed peace accords following the 1996 presidential elections.299 In these elections, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was voted
president.300 As the Rebel Unity Front were militarily weak and lost the
elections, it signed the Abidjan Accord in November 1996, in which the
parties consented to an immediate ceasefire and the disarmament of the
combatants.301 This agreement did not, however, contribute to a détente.
On the contrary, on May 25, 1997, the President of Sierra Leone was

297. This point also applies to the critique of the democratic intentions of the intervening States. See Richard A. Falk, The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order
Precedent for the United Nations, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 314, 353–54 (1995); Anne Orford,
Muscular Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the New Interventionism, 10 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 679, 701 (1999) (raising such critique in discussing NATO’s intervention in
Kosovo).
298. ROTH, supra note 131, at 386; James Crawford, Democracy in International
Law—A Reprise, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
123, at 114, 117. Contra John C. Pierce, The Haitian Crisis and the Future of Collective
Enforcement of Democratic Governance, 27 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 477, 485–96
(1996) (claiming that the Haiti intervention is a full-scale precedent for the emergence of
a right to democratic governance in international law); Fernando R. Tesón, Collective
Humanitarian Intervention, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 323, 355 (1996) (regarding the Haiti
intervention as a precedent for the emergence of a full-scale right to democratic intervention).
299. Timeline: Sierra Leone, BBC NEWS, Jun. 18 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/country_profiles/1065898.stm.
300. Id.
301. United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/
unamsil/background.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2008).
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overthrown.302 This prompted Nigerian troops of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (“ECOMOG”) to intervene. In June 1997, Nigerian forces
invaded Sierra Leone and helped to reinstate Kabbah as president in
March 1998. The U.N. Security Council only retroactively approved the
intervention. In October 1997, it expressed support for the ECOWAS
action,303 and on March 16, 1998, it welcomed President Kabbah’s return
to office.304
The legal scholarship identifies several justifications for the ECOMOG
intervention, including pro-democratic intervention,305 humanitarian intervention,306 and invitation by the de jure government.307 Some authors
have raised doubts concerning the democratic intentions of the intervening States, noting that Nigeria, the leader of the intervention, was itself
ruled by an autocratic government.308 However, in evaluating the intervention as a precedent for the emergence of a democracy principle, the
reception of the international community is more significant than the intentions of the intervening parties or the legality of the intervention itself.
The Security Council resolutions on Sierra Leone stress the importance
of restoring democratic order. Resolution 1132 requests the military junta

302. Id.
303. S.C. Res. 1132, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1132 (Oct. 8, 1997) (“Express[ing] its
strong support for the efforts of the ECOWAS Committee to resolve the crisis in Sierra
Leone and encourag[ing] it to continue to work for the peaceful restoration of the constitutional order, including through the resumption of negotiations”).
304. S.C. Res. 1156, S/RES/1156 (Mar. 16, 1998) (“Welcom[ing] the return to Sierra
Leone of its democratically elected president on 10 March 1998”).
305. Valentina Grado, Il ristabilimento della democrazia in Sierra Leone [Restoring
Democracy in Sierra Leone], 83 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 361, 395 (2000)
(Italy) (basing her argument on the defense of the internal dimension of the right to selfdetermination rather than on an explicit defense of democracy); Jeremy Levitt, Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Cases of ECOWAS in
Liberia and Sierra Leone, 12 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 333, 370 (1998).
306. Lee F. Berger, State Practice Evidence of the Humanitarian Intervention Doctrine: The ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone, 11 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 605,
626–32 (2001); Marco Gestri, ECOWAS Operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone: Amnesty for Past Unlawful Acts or Progress Toward Future Rules?, in REDEFINING SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE OF FORCE AFTER THE COLD WAR 211, 247 (Michael Bothe et al. eds.,
2005).
307. Matthias Goldmann, Sierra Leone: African Solutions to African Problems?, 9
MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. L. 457, 471–72 (2005); Karsten Nowrot & Emily W. Schabacker, The Use of Force to Restore Democracy: International Legal Implications of the
ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 321, 401–02 (1998).
308. Byers & Chesterman, supra note 256, at 290; Goldmann, supra note 307, at 473–
74.

2008]

THE PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRATIC TELEOLOGY

81

to reinstate democratic order,309 while Resolution 1156 welcomes the
country’s return to democracy.310 Therefore, the case of Sierra Leone,
confirms the patterns already observed with regard to Haiti. The international community views the overthrow of an elected government as a
violation of international law,311 and this supports the existence of a principle of democratic teleology in international law.
4. Resume
International law does not provide for a strict right to democratic
governance, as international documents and corresponding practice emphasize the process-oriented character of democratization. Democracy,
rather, is perceived as a teleological principle, according to which States
and societies are obliged to develop towards democracy. This principle
has two dimensions. First, it is directed against regressions in the process
of democratization. Obvious setbacks are military coups. This is underlined by the practice of the U.N. Security Council, which endorsed military
action after elected governments were overthrown in Haiti and Sierra
Leone and by the sanction mechanisms of the OAS and the AU.
Regressions, though, are not limited to coups d’état. They also encompass other setbacks in the process towards and consolidation of democracy, such as increased centralization of power by heads of state or the
cession of political control to the military. Examples include the 1992
autogolpe of Alberto Fujimori in Peru and the 1995 “constitutional referendum” of Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus.312 In particular, this is
reflected in the sanctioning practice of the OAS and, to a certain extent,
in that of the AU. Both organizations have the power to impose sanctions
not only for military coups, but also for other efforts to erode democracy.
Regional institutions have shown reluctance to act in cases where formal
elections have been held, but election results have been falsified by undue influence. In theory, such cases should constitute setbacks in the
process of democratization, which run counter to the principle of democratic teleology.
Democratic teleology is not merely concerned with avoiding setbacks
and regressions. It also imposes a second obligation whereby States must
309. S.C. Res. 1132, supra note 303, ¶ 1 (“Demand[ing] that the military junta take
immediate steps to relinquish power in Sierra Leone and make way for the restoration of
the democratically-elected Government and a return to constitutional order”).
310. See supra note 304.
311. See ROTH, supra note 131, at 393.
312. See Laurence Whitehead, The Consolidation of Fragile Democracies: A Discussion with Illustrations, in DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS: STOPPING THE PENDULUM 76,
76–95 (Robert A. Pastor ed., 1989) (providing further examples from Latin America).
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actively develop towards democracy and then consolidate democratic
institutions. As an ideal type of democracy as well as an ideal method of
democratization are lacking, this duty does not require specific performance. Governments have a certain margin of flexibility, and only clearly
defective strategies can be regarded as illegal. In order to assess strategies, the same classification proposed in the context of the principle of
self-determination may be used.313 According to this proposal, regimes
that are not self-enriching and that observe core human rights principles
should be considered legal and legitimate.
CONCLUSION
Nearly two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the euphoria surrounding democracy has cooled down considerably. Democracy is not
the cure-all it was widely considered to be. Moreover, the third wave of
democratization in the early 1990s314 was much weaker in the end than
many observers had predicted. Although there is near consensus in philosophy and political sciences that, in the long run, there can be no suitable alternative to democracy as a form of government, democratization is
not a simple change of the political status. Instead, it is a long-term,
complex, social process, and its preconditions are still very much debated
in social science research.
This contribution attempts to address these concerns by framing democracy as a teleological principle. In international law, democracy is
neither an absolute right nor a strict obligation. The identified norm, rather, focuses on the process-like character of democratization. States are
merely obliged to develop towards democracy. This understanding of the
democratic principle in international law better comports with existing
legal documents, which use process-oriented rather than prescriptive language. What constitutes concrete development in the process of democratization is, to a considerable extent, subject to a State’s own discretion.
Due to the binary character of legal norms, though, lawyers prefer
clear standards. Karl-Heinz Ladeur once offered a metaphor where he
compared the law to a blind man who uses “a stick to test the stability of
the ground on which he walks.”315 Throughout this process, the man distinguishes between stable and unstable ground.316 In so doing, he creates
a system of orientation without being able to evaluate the world in its
313. See supra Part II.A.2.
314. HUNTINGTON, supra note 36, at 280.
315. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, The Theory of Autopoiesis as an Approach to a Better Understanding of Postmodern Law: From the Hierarchy of Norms to the Heterarchy of Changing Patterns of Legal Inter-Relationships 12 (EUI Working Paper Law No. 99/3. 1999).
316. Id.
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entire complexity.317 Lawyers act in a similar fashion when they merely
ask about the legality or illegality of actions or conditions. In this context, they need standards that allow them to make clear binary distinctions. The stricter the legal standards are, the higher the determinacy of
the legal norms. Against this background, the principle of democratic
teleology fails to meet the standards most legal scholars favor. Whether a
State has held elections or not is a question of fact that can be answered
quite easily.318 In contrast, whether a government acts in the interests of
its population requires difficult normative evaluations.
Nonetheless, strict normative standards do not always take into account
the complexity of reality. Martti Koskenniemi has argued that the “indeterminacy” of norms is inherent to international legal principles.319 According to Koskenniemi, absolute legal standards are always over- or
under-inclusive.320 International law thus suffers from an inherent tension
between determinacy and justice. The more determinate the legal standards are, the less apt they are to take into account the complexity of
reality. Alternatively the more they adjust to complexity, the less determinate they are. In particular, as the effectiveness of international law
depends upon its level of acceptance in the international community, international law cannot afford to impose strict standards. It must apply to
circumstances and strategies as diverse as global democratization itself.
Francis Fukuyama’s diagnosis of “the end of history”321 is premature.
Democracy still has a long way to go, and this is reflected by the present
state of international law. In the legal debate of the 1990s, even those
authors who favored democratic entitlement did not claim the existence
of an unconditional right to democratic governance.322 Instead, most of
them identified a democratic trend,323 or most famously, an “emerging

317. Id.
318. See Marks, supra note 11, at 87 (suggesting that this is likely why the discussion
on the right to democratic governance is dominated by a static concept of democracy
focused only on elections). However, it is important to mention that this question is not
totally free of normative considerations either, given that judging elections as free and
fair requires some assessment. Guillermo O’Donnell, Illusions About Consolidation, 7.2
J. DEM. 34, 45 (1996).
319. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 590–96 (2005).
320. Id. at 591.
321. FUKUYAMA, supra note 2.
322. Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth, Introduction: The Spread of Liberal Democracy
and its Implications for International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 123, at 1, 13.
323. Rich, supra note 117, at 33.
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right to democratic governance.”324 As the present Article has argued,
this position should be reformulated: international law contains a principle of democratic teleology, namely, a right to the emergence of democratic governance.

324. Franck, supra note 3.

